1076
VOL. IX
(25 AUG — 14 SEPT)

1967

~~FOREIGN~~ FO 1744/404

File No. 1076

Name of File—

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS.

NO MINUTES TO BE WRITTEN HERE

RECORD OF WEEDING		
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LAST Year's File No. 1076/66

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1967

1076

(1883) D. 156230 177M 10/65 P.I. Gp. 610

S/S SAVING TO Rabat 1076

SAVING TELEGRAM

A2S 6.1X

Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE/COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO ABIDJAN AND CERTAIN OTHER MISSIONS

Telno 24 Saving 25 August, 1967 (J.I.P.G.)

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Abidjan telegram No. 24 Saving of 25 August.
Repeated for information Saving to: Certain other posts.

MIDDLE EAST TALKING POINTS
25 August, 1967

The Middle East crisis has not (repeat not) led to a massive withdrawal of Arab funds from London. A good deal of the money that went out has come back and within the past fortnight some large new deposits have been offered to London banks from the Middle East. According to an article in the London Times of 25 August "a leading Shaikh" has said "we shift our money from London to Zurich and get two per cent and the Swiss shift it back to London and get six". In the past few weeks there has been what one London banker called a "redispositioning of funds".

The London Guardian Miscellany Column said on 18 August that there had been a call for "true socialist markets" in which to deposit, "a call slightly marred by the fact that no such markets exist". Money that goes into Russia has an unpalatable habit of never coming out again.

"It is perhaps worth noting that the Arab Governments' own national interests were not and are not at all engaged in the question of the rights of the Palestine refugees. But this, perhaps, gave the Israelis an advantage, because they were fighting for something more easily understood by their soldiers - simple survival". - From a report from Lebanon published in the Ghanaian Times, 31 July.

Increasingly, oil industry strategists are turning to the possibility of by-passing the Suez Canal. Several companies are firmly committed to major "super-tanker" programmes, building ships that simply will not be able to use Suez. Apart from the half dozen 312,000 tonners already ordered by one company, latest estimates put the total number of further super-tankers on order, or about to be ordered, at an impressive 22. - London Evening Standard City Page, 14 August.

During the war the aggressor, using the most modern means of intercepting and interfering with radio channels, succeeded in mis-informing the commanders of enemy units and even in issuing false orders. This explains, among other things, the abandoning without resistance of the important strategic position of Sharm al Shaikh the incident when Arab Migs fought each other, the unplanned withdrawal of certain units, and similar weaknesses in the Arab defence. - Belgrade Radio, 11 August quoting an article on the Middle East war by Lt. Gen Ivan Miskovic in the Yugoslav paper Narodna Armija (National Army).

The canal managers had actually promised that by this summer it would be able to accommodate tankers with a 39 foot draught. But the canal authority told the Cairo newspaper "Al Ahram" (4 August) that it would now take a full year to redredge the canal back to its old depth.

RE[illegible] IN REGISTRY 31 AUG 1967

/During

During the past two months the Suez Canal has become shallower by several centimetres (owing to sand deposits). In one year its bottom may rise nearly half a metre, which would automatically mean reduction in traffic. Experts of the Canal Administration, who have already set out to remove the damage, believe that the Canal could be rendered fit for navigation in three months' time - naturally, provided Israel withdraws and no new destruction takes place. But even after the three months, the Canal would be able to handle ships of only 36 foot draught, not 38 foot as before the aggression. It will take a whole year for it to be made fully fit for navigation ... Tanyug Cairo dispatch, 14 August

---

"While dangling Israel as a lure before Arab eyes, however, the Russians have a much bigger goal, observers here (in Rome) indicate. Moscow's goal, spelled out time and again in official Party documents, is a gateway into the riches of Africa, control of Middle East oil and control of the passageway to India and the East". - Report from Rome, in The Pioneer (Ghana).

"We notice that Sudanese radio and television have adopted new policies ... What we object to, and strongly, is that the radio should lose its independent Sudanese character to become something else; that Sudanese television should lose its independent Sudanese character to become something else; that Sudanese television should lose its independent Sudanese characteristic to become a subsidiary of Egyptian television. Things have so developed that one cannot help feeling astonished. Sudanese songs praise a certain UAR hero ... and not Sudanese heroes - in spite of the great feats achieved by Sudanese heroes". - From the independent Khartoum paper Anba El Sudan, 28 July.

"We must firmly slam the door on the advocates of banning of oil exports, the suspension of pumping (for a period of three months from 1 September), or nationalisation. It is clear to all Arabs that these calls are in the interest of Communism at the expense of Arab interests. They aim at opening Arab oil markets to Russian oil. They also want the Arabs to boycott the West and become the friends of Communism, so that their land may become a sphere of Red influence.

"If this happens, Communism will turn its ugly, real face to the Arabs. It will make the Arabs live in peace and harmony with Israel in the sphere of Communism and under its principles. If the Arabs then reviewed accounts they would find that they had been used by Communism and that they had destroyed their countries' wealth and boycotted the world for the sake of Communism and the liberation of Palestine. They would finally discover that instead of liberating Palestine they had placed the band of Red slavery round their necks. In that situation return would be difficult, if not impossible." - Jiddah Radio in Arabic, 15 August.

"Many people in the UAR are of the opinion that if the main question on the agenda at the Baghdad conference of Arab Finance, Economy and Oil Ministers - the ban on oil supplies to the Western States who inspired and actively supported the Israeli aggression - is settled satisfactorily, it will be an important step towards the

consolidation of the Arab national liberation movement. Nobody overlooks in Cairo the fact that great difficulties will be encountered in Baghdad during the examination of this question for, as a result of the oil embargo, the oil producing Arab States have suffered appreciable material losses". - Moscow Radio in Serbo-Croat, quoting a Soviet dispatch from Cairo, 15 August.

"Halting oil production for three months, as advocated by certain Arab countries, would undoubtedly harm a number of European countries. However, this is a two-edged weapon, particularly because we are telling our enemy in advance that he will not be supplied with oil for only three months. It is as if we were calling upon the enemy to tighten his belt and look for other sources of supply during this period and until matters return to normal. The Arabs should consider the results of any economic weapon they intend to use and must make sure that the weapon does not backfire and have negative results." - Ad-Dustur article, quoted by Amman Radio in Arabic, 15 August.

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J.I.P.G.D.

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1076

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

& TEL. No. 89 SAVING TO Rabat

PRIORITY ALGIERS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 409 25 August 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 409 of 25 August, Repeated for information Saving to Khartoum, Washington, Paris, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman, Jedda, Rabat, Tunis, Tripoli, Benghazi, Beirut, Kuwait, Bahrain (Residency).

Khartoum Summit.

Since the Algerian delegation returned from Baghdad there has been no official comment on what happened there. The Press has confined itself to reproducing comments from other unofficial Arab sources, including some frankly pessimistic ones.

2. Nor has there been any announcement yet about Algerian representation at Khartoum tomorrow. It still seems probable that Bouteflika will leave this evening, but it is much less certain that Boumedonne will join him next week; there is little doubt that the Algerians are pessimistic about the outcome and are reluctant to attend at all.

3. Although their main efforts, if they attend, will no doubt be directed to getting the Algerian/Iraqi plan for sanctions approved, they have always maintained that (to quote recent El Moudjahid leader) sanctions alone can never suffice to liquidate the consequences of the Zionist aggression. There has however been no sign that they are prepared to contemplate a political solution (Tito's initiative has never been referred to here) and their line is likely to remain one of opposition to all compromise: the war must continue. We can expect them to demand a stepping up of guerilla activity and more help for resistance movements.

4. If the meetings do not go their way they may try, if the Syrians and Iraqis will go along with them, to break them up and put the blame on the moderates. But it is more likely that they will sit tight and disassociate themselves afterwards, taking the line that the interests of the Arab masses have been betrayed by reactionary and unrepresentative Governments.

Foreign Office pass Saving Khartoum 2, Washington 60, Paris 54, Cairo 14, Tel Aviv 8, Amman 8, Jedda 6, Rabat 12. Tunis 14, Tripoli 17, Benghazi 3, Beirut 13, Kuwait 5, Bahrain (Residency) 5.

Mr. Dawbarn

Sent 1530Z/ 25 August
Recd 1707Z/ 25 August
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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N.E.A.D.

AJS 6.IX

PPPPP

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY
- 6 SEP 1967

(4)

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SAVING TELEGRAM

FROM PARIS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

023 TOP COPY

By Bag

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 10
24 AUG 1967
OD 54715

OD.

Sir P. Reilly

No. 130 Saving

22 August 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 130 Saving of 22 August.

Baghdad Conference of Arab States

Everson asked Brunet whether reports had been received from the French Ambassador in Baghdad and Brunet read out the following extracts from telegrams.

2. The French Ambassador had been told by a Saudi Arabian contact that the Iraqis were bent on nationalising the I.P.C. or at least the British, American and Dutch shares in it.

3. The conference had before it the Iraqi proposals to impose an oil embargo for three months (so as to show the Western Europeans that they could not live without Arab oil), to create an Arab Common Market, to withdraw bank deposits from the West and put them into Arab enterprises, to form a common fund for military expenditure and, after three months, to put a special additional tax on all oil exported.

4. The Syrian, Sudanese and Yemeni representatives supported these proposals. The Algerian delegate said that he agreed in principle but Algeria could not apply an oil embargo because that would not be fair to countries which had shown sympathy with the Arab cause and Algeria was unwilling to complicate her relations with France and Spain. The UAR delegate was throughout undecided; he said that his country would go along with the majority. Morocco and Tunisia gave no support. The Kuwaiti reminded the conference that his country had already spent a lot of money on supporting other Arab States. Libya showed no enthusiasm and the Saudi Arabian came out against any embargo. Jordan, in view of the plight of her economy, would not be able to take any economic measures.

5. In the face of this disarray the Iraqis retreated. The

Algerians /

Algerians tabled an independent proposal to create an Arab Common Market and a financial pool (but it was not clear fo. what purpose).

6. Apparently the Iraqis issued a communiqué in the middle of the conference which revealed that the Algerians had pronounced against an embargo on petroleum and this forced the Algerians to take a tougher line and to state publicly, in their turn, that they would support an oil embargo.

7. The conference petered out without any decisions being taken. There was a desire not to exacerbate differences before the Arab summit meeting. It was suggested that Ministers for the petroleum industry should accompany Ministers for Foreign Affairs to the next meeting at Khartoum so as to try to reach agreement on the oil problem.

8. The French Ambassador's conclusions were that the Arabs were unable to reach a decision to hold up their oil and that the moderates had had the best of it at Baghdad. In the end all rested on their original positions. Hatred of Israel was not sufficient to compel the Arabs to adopt a common policy. The Arab world was as divided as ever.

9. Brunet asked that we should not repeat not let the French Embassy in London know that he had passed on these reports.

10. Foreign Office please repeat as considered necessary.

Sir P. Reilly Recd. 23 August

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
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News Dept.
Western Dept.
J.R.D. (Western Section)
J.R.D. (Econ. Section)
Arabian Dept.
J.I.P.G.D.
J.I.R.D.
N.E.A.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

E d/6

CHANCERY,
RABAT.

With the compliments of

FOREIGN OFFICE

(EASTERN DEPT)

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY
-6 SEP 1967

LONDON, S.W.1.

25 AUGUST 1967.

AZS 6.1x

CONFIDENTIAL

1076

Rabat

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By Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES

Guidance No. 218 25 August, 1967. (IPG)

CONFIDENTIAL

The Middle East Situation

This Guidance reviews recent developments in the Middle East situation. Paragraphs 6, 7, 12 and 16 are for your own information. You may draw on the rest in talking to representatives of friendly governments, and on a non-attributable basis, with trustworthy journalists and other reliable contacts.

The British View

2. We have always taken the view that the United Nations has a vital rôle to play in achieving a lasting solution in the Middle East. So far, however, neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly have been able to agree on a substantive resolution on the main problems. In the Emergency Session, both the Latin American and the non-aligned draft resolutions (Guidance No. 173 of 4 July) were defeated on 4 July. After further back-stage efforts to reach a last minute compromise had foundered on the intransigence of the extreme Arabs, the Assembly on 21 July adopted a procedural resolution referring the Middle East problem back to the Security Council. The Assembly's debate had, however, shown a substantial measure of agreement about the elements which should form part of any eventual settlement. It was encouraging that the Russians were in the end prepared to stand against the Arabs and vote for the adjournment. Even more, it was encouraging that they and the Americans privately agreed on a draft resolution (the Dobrynin draft) which in essence contained the main elements of the Latin American draft. In particular, it established the necessary balance by affirming as principles:-

(a) Withdrawal, without delay, by the parties to the conflict from territories occupied by them;

(b) Acknowledgement, without delay by all in the area that each has the right to independence and to live in peace and security and that all claims and acts inconsistent therewith should be renounced.

It also foresaw efforts, making use of a United Nations presence, to solve the problems in the Middle East and especially those of refugees and freedom of transit through international waterways. The existence of Soviet/American agreement on this basis became widely known.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY -6 SEP 1967

3. Our view remains that any settlement will have to take account of the four points made by the Secretary of State in his speech to the General Assembly on 21 June (Verbatim No.291/67). We think the next step should be taken in the Security Council and we hope this can be done before the General Assembly meets on 19 September. The difficulties of singling out any aspect of the problem lead us to think that a comprehensive resolution covering the appointment of a United Nations representative and a statement of principle on the lines of the Dobrynin draft would be the best approach, although we do not exclude others. For the time being, it seems best to leave it to the United States and USSR to work out details. We would want the opening of the Canal to have priority and would want to make sure that all concerned understood that the ending of belligerency would result in this. But we do not wish to make too much of this point except to friends and allies. Should it turn out that one comprehensive resolution will not work, we would certainly consider other approaches. But for the time being this seems the most hopeful line.

4. We do not intend to advocate any particular solution of any aspect of the problem. However, the future of the Old City of Jerusalem, for which some form of international control seems likely to be the best solution and the position of the refugees both old and new, form the most indigestible core of the problem. For this reason we are particularly opposed to Israeli moves to make the Jerusalem issue un-negotiable, and have pressed the Israelis to extend the dateline of 31 August for the return of refugees and to accept as many of them back as possible.

5. We consider that it is to both our and the Israeli interest that the West Bank territories should be returned to Jordan as we think that a rump Jordan would not long survive, that the probable outcome would be its absorption by Syria which would lead to a more intransigent Arab attitude, and adversely affect developments throughout the Arab world.

6. For your own information, the reopening of the Suez Canal is the aspect of the situation which concerns us most immediately. Although we have no wish to advertise the fact or make the running, we wish to mobilise as much international opinion as possible behind the concept that in the common international interest the Canal should be opened as a result of concessions by both sides, if necessary in advance of a general settlement.

7. For your own information also, following the Arab-Israel war the extra cost on oil to the United Kingdom balance of payments will be up to about £20 million per month, of which

the greater proportion arises from closure of the Canal. Heavy payments have had to be made to foreign tanker owners. The effect on dry cargo is much less, but as most of our chartered shipping is on long-term charter there is very little benefit to United Kingdom shipowners from increased rates and there is loss to United Kingdom users. In addition, the United Kingdom shipowners with ships stuck in the Canal would lose £1 million in revenue if closure were to last for six months, quite apart from cargo losses. The Egyptians have so far taken the line that they are not prepared to open any part of the Canal before the Israelis withdraw from the East Bank. We estimate that there are about ten blockages both to the north and south of the Great Bitter Lake. Estimates of the time it would take to remove the obstacles vary. We calculate it might take up to two months for the purely engineering work, though the obstacles to the south of the Great Bitter Lake might be removed in a much shorter time.

The Israel position

8. At a Press conference on 14 August Mr. Eban, Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs made it clear that Israel would not declare her proposals in advance of negotiations but intended to keep all options open. There could be no question of a return to the situation before 5 June, and the Old City of Jerusalem must be regarded as permanently under the sovereignty of Israel who would guarantee access for all to the Holy Places.

9. So far the indications are that the more moderate elements in the Israel Government represented by the Prime Minister and Mr. Eban, who are still in control, would settle for a return to the Arabs of all conquered territory apart from the Old City of Jerusalem and except for certain rectifications of the Jordan border and satisfactory arrangements for the Syrian heights, Sharm El Sheikh, the Gaza Strip and passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal. In return they would require Peace Treaties with the Arabs. However, other elements in the Israel Government, notably General Dayan and Mr. Allon, the Minister of Labour, both of whom aspire to succeed Mr. Eshkol as Prime Minister, have publicly advocated permanent annexation of the West Bank territory of Jordan.

10. So far the Israelis have been taking a tough line in private as well as public and argue that there is no advantage in pressing for early progress or resolutions in the United Nations. They say they intend to stay where they are until the realities of the situation persuade the Arabs of the advantages of negotiating a genuine peace.

/ 11.

11. However in the long run Israel needs international support and it is not to be excluded that international pressure on them, to be more flexible and reasonable, to which we shall contribute whenever we can, will have some effect.

12. The Israelis would much prefer no United Nations resolution, or at most a resolution asking for the appointment of a Mediator. Anything further they regard as interfering with the process whereby with the passage of time Arab States are made to face the reality (according to the Israel thesis) that they will not secure Israeli withdrawal without direct negotiations with Israel.

The Arab positions

13. No unified Arab position has emerged either from the meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers in Khartoum from 1 to 5 August or from the subsequent meeting of Arab Finance Economic and Petroleum Ministers in Baghdad. Despite great efforts to avoid open quarrels a three-way division has been developing between

(a) the extremists; Algeria and Syria, possibly with some support from Iraq, who favour continuing the war using guerilla tactics and appealing to the Chinese for help if the Russians turn them down;

(b) the U.A.R. which, whether for tactical reasons or otherwise, seems content for the time being to let the Syrians and Algerians make the extremist running and to let it be known that the U.A.R. is disposed to be moderate;

(c) the moderates, of whom Jordan is under the greatest pressure to seek an accommodation, but is, we think rightly, keeping her head down.

14. There is a possibility that if this division persists, and Russian influence on the U.A.R. is exerted in a generally moderating direction, a situation might evolve in which it would be possible for the Arabs, or some of them, to negotiate a limited settlement under United Nations cover. Such chances as there are would also be contingent upon the Israelis showing a greater degree of flexibility.

The position of the Soviet Union

15. The Soviet leaders are continuing their policy of seeking to extend their influence with the Arab Governments and of causing the maximum damage to Western interests. At the

same time they appear to accept that they must work to prevent a recurrence of hostilities with its attendant danger of a confrontation with the United States. The costs of supporting their Arab friends and their political and economic interest in seeing the Canal re-opened must also weigh with them. They now seem to be seeking an interim settlement based on an Israeli withdrawal in return for a declaration by the Arabs of an end to the state of belligerence. They are having a hard job to sell this proposition to the more extreme Arabs. (For fuller details please see paragraphs 15 to 22 of Intel No. 23 of 16 August).

The American position

16. For your own information, the Americans reject the basic Israeli contention that a final peace settlement negotiated directly with the Arabs is the only solution, and seem determined to get a Resolution agreed with the Russians and through the Security Council in September if they can. The State Department have been nettled by the rigid Israeli attitude. Present indications are that they intend to take a strong line with the Israelis, whom they hope to be able to persuade to move from their present position in the direction of action at the United Nations.

Conclusion

17. To sum up: Israel is in no hurry to make a move and believes that time is on her side; the Arabs are divided; the Soviet Union and the United States are feeling their way towards possible solutions, but are hampered in particular by the limited susceptibility of the Arabs and Israel to external advice and pressure.

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~~44444~~

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cypher/ICA A

[Distribution Heading]

FROM 70.

TO Rabat

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 442 D M

[Date] 25 Aug R M

Repeated to

[Priority]

I have informed M. Lamb of the contents of this and permitted him a look de papier on it Tuesday 29/8

A.L. Southorn 29.VIII
C. a'H. Jun 30/8
30/8
D.A. Jun.

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO JEDDA TELEGRAM NO.1249 OF 25 AUGUST

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO KUWAIT TRIPOLI

BENGHAZI TUNIS RABAT BAHRAIN BEIRUT AMMAN TEHRAN

AND SAVING TO TEL AVIV WASHINGTON AND UKMIS

NEW YORK.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO.533: JORDAN.

PLEASE ASSURE KING FAISAL OF OUR CONCERN FOR THE

FUTURE OF KING HUSSEIN AND JORDAN AND OF OUR WISH

TO DO EVERYTHING OPEN TO US IN EXISTING

CIRCUMSTANCES TO ENSURE THE SURVIVAL OF THE KING

AND HIS REGIME AND TO ASSIST HIM TOWARDS

RECOVERING HIS LOST TERRITORIES. IT MAY BE USEFUL

TO GO OVER WITH KING FAISAL THE HELP WHICH WE

HAVE ALREADY GIVEN. IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY

AFTER THE WAR WE SENT EMERGENCY SHIPMENTS OF

DISTRIBUTION

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

/Blankets

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

ANKETS, TENTS AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND WE MADE

A GRANT OF HALF A MILLION POUNDS STERLING FOR

URGENT RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION PROJECTS.

IN ADDITION, WE MADE AN EMERGENCY GRANT OF HALF

A MILLION DOLLARS TO U.N.R.W.A. OVER AND ABOVE

OUR REGULAR CONTRIBUTION OF 4.5 MILLION DOLLARS

FOR THE CURRENT YEAR. MEANWHILE, OUR NORMAL AID

PROGRAMME, COMPRISING BOTH BUDGETARY AID AND

DEVELOPMENT LOANS, CONTINUES. LATTERLY, KING

HUSSEIN HAS TOLD US OF HIS URGENT NEED TO RE-EQUIP

THE ROYAL JORDANIAN AIR FORCE WITH HAWKER HUNTER

AIRCRAFT AND WE HAVE DONE WHAT WE CAN TO HELP.

ALTHOUGH HUNTERS ARE NO LONGER BEING MADE, WE

AGREED TO REDUCE THE R.A.F.~S OPERATIONAL

CAPABILITY BY RELEASING TO JORDAN 3 HUNTER AIRCRAFT

FROM THE R.A.F.~S FRONT LINE. WE HOPE THAT THESE

AIRCRAFT AND 4 OTHER HUNTERS AT PRESENT BEING

REFURBISHED IN THIS COUNTRY WILL HELP TO FORM

A NUCLEUS AROUND WHICH THE R.J.A.F. CAN BE

REBUILT. AS AFTER THE DEFENCE REVIEW THE UNITED

KINGDOM~S DEFENCE ESTABLISHMENT HAD BEEN PARED

down

DOWN TO THE BONE. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO RELEASE

OTHER AIRCRAFT WITHOUT AN UNACCEPTABLE WEAKENING

OF THE R.A.F.

2. IN THE CONTEXT OF POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR JORDAN.

YOU MAY LIKE TO REMIND KING FAISAL OF MY STATEMENTS

AT THE U.N. AND IN PARLIAMENT ABOUT JERUSALEM

AND THE NEED FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE

TERRITORIES WHICH THEY HAVE OCCUPIED. YOU MAY

ALSO LIKE TO MENTION THE REPRESENTATIONS WE HAVE

MADE TO THE ISRAELIS URGING GREATER FLEXIBILITY

IN THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE RETURN OF REFUGEES.

TO THE WEST BANK. WE HAVE REASON TTO BELIEVE

THAT OUR REPRESENTATIONS WERE OF SOME EFFECT IN

PERSUADING THE ISRAELIS TO MAKE A RETURN OFFER

AT ALL.

3. YOU MAY LIKE TO MENTION TO KING FAISAL THAT

WE HAVE GIVEN CAREFUL THOUGHT TO THE DILEMMA

IN WHICH KING HUSSEIN FINDS HIMSELF OF BEING

UNABLE TO SECURE AN EARLY RETURN OF ANY OF THE

LOST TERRITORIES WITHOUT AGREEING TO NEGOTIATIONS

WITH ISRAEL. IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES WE HAVE

/thought

THOUGHT HIM RIGHT NOT TO RISK THE DANGERS OF ATTEMPTING SUCH A NEGOTIATION. WE AGREE. HOWEVER, ONE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF KING HUSSEIN INFORMING THE PEOPLE OF JORDAN AND JORDAN~S FRIENDS OF THE REAL NATURE OF JORDAN~S PROBLEMS AS THIS SEEMS A NECESSARY FIRST STEP TOWARDS ANY RECOVERY OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

4. AS IT IS EVIDENT THAT THERE IS MUCH INTEREST IN OTHER MODERATE ARAB COUNTRIES IN OUR PRESENT POSITION WITH REGARD TO JORDAN WHICH THEY SEEM TO REGARD AS A TOUCHSTONE OF THE SINCERITY OF OUR DESIRE FOR FRIENDSHIP WITH THE ARABS. H.M. REPRESENTATIVES IN OTHER ARAB POSTS ADDRESSED AND TEHRAN. MAY IF APPROPRIATE, MAKE USE OF THE MATERIAL IN THIS TELEGRAM IN SPEAKING TO THE GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH THEY ARE ACCREDITED AT WHATEVER LEVEL SEEMS MOST APPROPRIATE TO DEMONSTRATE OUR CONCERN AND SUPPORT FOR JORDAN IN THEIR PRESENT DIFFICULTIES.

SOSFA

1076
England
& 10 35

BRITISH EMBASSY
RABAT

25 August 1967

RESTRICTED

Dear Department,

We are afraid that we have very little of substance to report about the talks that King Hussein of Jordan had with his brother monarch, Hassan II of Morocco , during the former's visit to Rabat which took place from 21 to 23 August.

2. The general consensus of informed and intelligent Moroccan and diplomatic opinion here is that the King was touring the moderate Arab governments to press for a summit which would deal with the basic problem of the aftermath of the occupation of the west bank by the Israelis. The King wanted to avoid a repetition of the Khartoum and Baghdad conferences, which had achieved disagreement over a welter of extraneous questions. This might take years to resolve. Jordan had no time to wait while Israeli troops were still on her soil, and since a resumption of war was impossible for her, wanted to be free to achieve a political solution, without being held back by any assertion that such a solution should be undertaken in parallel with any moves made by the Syrians or Egyptians to regain their lost territory. Some Moroccans even went so far as to say that Hussein wanted to know what Moroccan (and American) support he would have if he negotiated a return of his territory with Israel. It is understood that the King wished to marshall the moderates in his support before the summit. The Moroccans were certainly prepared to support him to the full - so long as they did not expose themselves unduly - but they were sceptical as to whether he would be able to achieve anything in the face of the apparently unyielding Israelis.

3. The Jordanian Chargé d'Affaires, without revealing any details, says that his King was completely satisfied with the results of his visit.

4. We are copying this letter to Chanceries at Amman and Tel Aviv.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY

Eastern Department,
Foreign Office.

RESTRICTED

1076

A.L. Sowton 29.VIII
J.O. 3/8
C. of Sqn

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
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[Distribution Heading]

FROM F.O. TO RABAT.

No. 441 D M

25 AUG. R M

Repeated to

ROUTINE

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ADDRESSED TO TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO.1854 OF 25 AUGUST

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK UKMIS

GENEVA WASHINGTON TRIPOLI BENGHAZI KUWAIT BAHRAIN

(AGENCY) KHARTOUM JEDDA RABAT TUNIS JERUSALEM AMMAN

CAIRO (BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION) AND ALGIERS.

1076/67.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO.965.

DISTRIBUTION

I ACCEPT THE RECOMMENDATION IN YOUR PARAGRAPH 4

THAT WE SHOULD POSTPOME PUBLICITY FOR YOUR

REPRESENTATIONS TO THE ISRAELIS.

2. IF THERE HAS BEEN NO MOVE BY THE ISRAELIS

BEFORE THEN YOU SHOULD MAKE ANOTHER APPROACH TO

MR. EBAN. OR FAILING HIM TO THE PRIME MINISTER. OR

TO WHICHEVER MINISTER IS IN CHARGE OF THE M.F.A/ ON

29 AUGUST. NEWS DEPARTMENT WOULD ANNOUNCE THIS AT

THEIR 12 O~CLOCK PRESS CONFERENCE ON 31 AUGUST IF

THERE HAD STILL BEEN NO FAVOURABLE ISRAELI

REACTION. THIS TIME AABLE WOULD ALLOW THE

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

ISRAELIS 24 HOURS IN WHICH TO REACT WITHOUT BEING UNDER PUBLIC PRESSURE FROM H.M.G. IF YOU JUDGED IT USEFUL YOU COULD INFORM THEM OF OUR INTENTION ABOUT PUBLICITY WHEN MAKING YOUR SECOND DEMARCHE.

3. H.M. AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON, SHOULD INFORM THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF THESE INSTRUCTIONS. SOSFA.

SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX

VX

PRODROME RABATDFDF TKU
PRODROME RABAT
PRODROME LONDON
PRODROME RABAT

1076

FORAB 1 FO LDN GRPS 1040 2607302

ROUTINE FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO RABAT

ELNO 443 25 AUGUST, 1967

A.L. Souttar 29.VIII
C. a'A. Thw 29/8
I.O 29/8
A.O.S. A most excellent speech! 29/8

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM TUNIS.

ADDSD TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 249 OF 25 AUGUST RPTD FOR INFO TO MOSCOW, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, TRIPOLI, BENGHAZI, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, KHARTOUM, JEDDA, RABAT, AMMA, BRITISH INTERESTS SECTIONS COLON CAIRO, ALGIERS. THE FOLLOWING ARE EXTRACTS FROM PRESIDENT'S BOURGUIBA'S ADDRESS TO THE RECENTLY ELECTED BUREAU OF THE UNION GENERAL DES ETUDIANTS TUNISIENS.

A. A MISTAKE ON THE PART OF A LEADER CAN BE FATAL FOR HIS PEOPLE DESPITE THE GOOD INTENTIONS WHICH HE HAS. WE HAVE HAD RECENT PROOF OF THIS. BECAUSE THE AGGRESSORS WERE EXPECTED FROM THE EAST AND THEY ARRIVED FROM THE WEST, BECAUSE A MISTAKE WAS MADE ON THE BALANCE OF FORCES, BECAUSE THE MOMENT WAS INOPPORTUNE TO THROW DOWN A CHALLENEGE TO THE ENEMY, WE NOW SEETHE ARAB COUNTRIES SUBJECTED TO THE WORST POSSIBLE HUMILIATION OF DEFEAT AND OCCUPATION. ISRAEL WAS CONTENT WITH HER FRONTIERS AND DEMANDED NEITHER THE WHOLE OF THE CITY OF JERUSALEM NOR THE WEST BANK OF THE JORDAN, NOR THE OTHER TERRITORIES WHICH SHE OCCUPIES TODAY TO THE EAST AND TO THE NORTH. DELIBERATELY AND WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE RISKS, MEASURES WERE TAKEN TO PREVENT HER ACCESS TO THE GULF OF AQABA IN DEFIANCE OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND THE ACTUAL STATE OF AFFAIRS. ONE KNEW WITH CERTAINTY THAT THE ENEMY WOULD NOT FAIL TO REACT AND THE ARAB PRESS ITSELF LET THIS BE UNDERSTOOD. ONE EVEN FORESAW THIS REACTION AND INDEED ONE EVEN HOPED FOR IT. SINCE THEN THE ISRAELI ARMY HAS REACHED THE BANKS OF THE SUEZ CANAL AND THE ARABS AFTER HAVING BEEN SUBJECTED TO A REIGN OF STEEL FIRE AND NAPALM ONCE AGAIN FIND THEMSELVES REFUGEES.

B. SINCE THE COLD WAR HAS DIVIDED THE WORLD INTO TWO OPPOSING CAMPS STUDENTS HAVE BECOME THE OBJECT OF GREAT ATTENTION. EACH CAMP WANTS THEM ON THEIR SIDE. THUS CERTAIN PROPAGANDISTS EXPLOIT THE JUVENILE ENTHUSIASMS OF STUDENTS IN AN ATTEMPT TO INTOXICATE

SERVICE ◇ TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇

THEM TO THE POINT WHERE THEY HAVE LOST ALL POSSI ILITY OF PERSONAL JUDGMENT. THUS ''SATELLISED'' THEY BECOME THE EMPTY ECHO OF THE PROPAGANDA THAT THEY HAVE NOT TAKEN THE TROUBLE TO ANALYSE. THEY WANT TO HAVE PROGRESSIVE IDEAS ON EVERY QUESTION. IN THEIR EYES THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE SOVIET UNION HAS A LABEL OF PROGRESSIVENESS. IN THIS WAY ALIGNING THEMSELVES INDISCRIMINATELY WITH ATTITUDES THAT THEY HAVE NOT EVOLVED THEMSELVES. THEY CONSIDER THAT SALLAL OF THE YEMEN IS A PROGRESSIVE BUT THAT BOURGUIBA WHOSE ACTIVITIES ARE CONCENTRATED ON THE EMANCIPATION OF WOMEN, THE INSTRUCTION OF THE YOUNG AND THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE POOR, IS NOT PROGRESSIVE.

C. WE KNOW WHAT ''DON QUICHOTISM'' COSTS THE REGIMES WHICH DESCRIBE THEMSELVES AS REVOLUTIONARY. HOWEVER WHILE THEY ARE FIGHTING THE WINDMILLS OF IMPERIALISM THE PEOPLE FOR WHOM THEY HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY CONTINUE TO LIVE IN BLACK MISERY, EVEN THE ECERCISE OF THE MOST ELEMENTARY LIBERTIES IS FORBIDDEN THEM. THE STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALISM HAS BECOME THE SOLE PRE-OCCUPATION OF THESE REGIMES. THUS OVER THE PALESTINE AFFAIR, THEY HAVE FOLLOWED A POLICY WHICH CONSISTS OF ABANDONING THE SUBSTANCE FOR THE SHADOW. THE STATE OF ISRAEL IS RECOGNISED AS SUCH BOTH BY AMERICA AND THE SOVIET UNION, IT IS A MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS EXISTENCE IS ONLY CONTESTED BY THE ARAB STATES. IN THESE CONDITIONS IT IS USELESS TO INSIST OBSTINATELY ON NOT RECOGNISING THIS REALITY. TO CLAIM TO EFFACE ISRAEL FROM THE MAP OF THE WORLD IS TO CONDEMN ONESELF TO ALMOST TOTAL ISOLATION. THE POLICY ADOPTED UP TO NOW HAS ALIENATED ALL SYMPATHY FROM US AND NO NATION HAS WANTED TO SEE AGGRESSOR IN ISRAEL. ON THE CONTRARY IT IS ADMITTED THAT IT WAS EGYPT WHICH CREATED THE CAUSUS BELLI (UNDERLINED) DOTS SINCE 1947 THAT IS SINCE THE TIME WHEN ISRAEL WAS RECOGNISED BY THE UNITED NATIONS WE SHOULD HAVE TAKEN ACCOUNT OF THIS FACT IN CHOOSING A STRATEGY WHICH WOULD HAVE ASSURED US VICTORY OVER ISRAELI COLONIALISM. AFTER THE DEFEAT WHICH THE ARAB STATES HAVE JUST EXPERIENCED THEY MUST ABANDON THE HOPELESS POLICY WHICH THEY HAVE PURSUED FOR THE PAST TWENTY YEARS. WHATEVER IT COSTS THEY WILL BE FORCED TO PUT AN END TO THE STATE OF WAR IN ORDER TO RECOUP THE TERRITORY CONQUERED BY ISRAEL AND TO AVOID EVEN GREATER DANGERS. THEY MUST HENCEFORTH SEEK TO BRING THEIR PEOPLES UP TO THE LEVEL OF THE STRONG AND HIGHLY-DEVELOPED NATIONS SO THAT THEY WILL BE CAPABLE ONE DAY OF PREVENTING ALL INJUSTICE AND DISCOURAGING ALL AGGRESSION.M

D. THE PROBLEM OF VIETNAM IS NOT AS SIMPLE AS IT SEEMS. IT IS A SERIOUS PROBLEM WHICH CONCERNS THE WORLD BALANCE OF POWER. AT THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR THE WORLD WAS DIVIDED INTO TWO CAMPS COLON THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AND THE OTHERS DOTS IT IS THEREFORE AS A RESULT OF THE PARALLEL ''LIBERATIONS'' MADE BY THE RUSSIANS AND THE AMERICANS THAT A LINE OF

SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX

DEMARKATION WAS ESTABLISHED CORRESPONDING TO THE ADVANCES OF THE DIFFERENT ARMIES. GERMANY, AUSTRIA, KOREA AND LATER VIETNAM HAVE BECOME SUCCESSIVE THREATS OF CONFRONTATION DOTS SINCE THEN CHINA HAS ENTERED THE FRAY AND IN ENCOURAGING HANOI TO BE INTRANSIGENT SHE ONLY HAS IN MIND TO CONFOUND HER SOVIET BROTHER ENEMY AND TO PROVE TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT THE GUERILLA ARMY CAN DEFEAT THE AMERICAN ARMY. IF THIS WERE TO HAPPEN AMERICA WOULD HAVE BEEN PROVED NOT TO HAVE BEEN INVINCIBLE DESPITE HER ATOMIC BOMB. CHIMA WOULD THEN HOPE FORMALMOST ANYTHING AND NOTHING WOULD BE ABLE TO STOP THE UNLEASHING OF HER MASSES ON VIETNAM, ASIA AND RUSSIA ITSELF. FURTHERMORE SHE WOULD TAKE OVER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD. IT IS IN THE LIGHT OF THIS FACTS THAT ONE HAS TO UNDERSTAND THE DEMAND REPEATEDLY MADE BY LEADERS IN HANOI FOR ''THE AGGRESSOR'' TO WITHDRAW BEFORE ANY NEGOTIATIONS ARE STARTED DOTS CHINA IS TODAY AT THE MERCY OF THE MADNESS OF THE RED GUARDS WHO DO NOT EVEN RESPECT THE IMMUNITY OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS. ONE HAS REASON TO FEAR THE WORST FROM THESE WILD HORDES, RUSSIA IS FAR FROM WANTING A CHINESE VICTORY BECUASE SHE KNOWS TO WHAT PERILS SHE HERSELF WOULD BE EXPOSED. THE WHOLE OF THE ASIATIC PART OF HER TERRITORY WOULD BE SERIOUSLY THREATENED. TODAY THE SOVIET UNION FEARS THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA MORE THAN SHE FEARS THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. PERHAPS IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ONE DAY SHE WILL NEED THIS HELP AS AT THE TIME OF THE HITLERITE AGGRESSION. THINGS ARE FAR FROM BEING SIMPLE AND WHAT ONE CALLS ''IMPERIALIST'' IS OFTEN NO MORE THAN A QUESTION OF POINT OF VIEW DOTS THE PRESENT CONFLICT HAS A SCOPE AND MEANING OUTSIDE VIETNAM DOTS FACTS OF GEOGRAPHY, THE SPECIFIC HISTORY OF CHINA, AND THE STALINIST IDEOLOGY TO WHICH SHE IS ATTACHED ALL THIS INDICATES THAT VIETNAM WILL EXPERIENCE THE SAME FATE AS THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL EUROPE DURING THE TIME OF STALIN. IF COMMUNISM DECLARES ITSELF TO BE A CHAMPION OF DEMOCRACY AND INDEPENDENCE IT IS ONLY IN OTHER COUNTIRES AND NOT IN THOSE WHICH HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED TO THE YOKE OF STALIN OR WHICH ARE THREATENED WITH THAT OF MAO.

E. TUNISIA ENJOYS THE RESEPCT OF EVERYONE, OF THE SOVIET UNION AS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OF FRANCE WITH WHOM SHE WAS SO LONG IN CONFLICT. WE DO NOT SUFFER FROM THE COMPLEX OF THE DECOLONISED COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO OUTGROW THEIR OLD RANCOURS.

FOREIGN OFFICE PASS UKMIS NEW YORK 01125 WASHINGTON 01325 AND RABAT 02225

= SOSFA

SENT 260752Z JW

PRODROME RABAT

1076.

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cypher/ICA 5 A

[Distribution Heading]

FROM 70

TO Rabat

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 446 D M

[Date] 26 Aug R M

Repeated to

[Priority]

AZS 29.VIII

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLG RECD FROM TUNIS.

ADDSD TO FO TEL NO 249 OF 25/8

REPTD FOR INFMN TO MOSCOW UKMIS NEW YORK

WASHINGTON BIS ALGIERS AMMAN BAHRAIN BENGHAZI

BIS CAIRO JEDDA KHARTOUM KUWAIT RABAT TRIPOLI

AND TEL AVIV.

M I F T.

TODAYS QUOTE LA PRESSE UNQUOTE CONTAINS TEXT OF

BOURGUIBA~S ADDRESS TO THE NEWLY ELECTED BUREAU

OF THE UNION GENERALE DES ETUDIANTS TUNISIENS.

THIS CONTAINS COMMON SENSE AND COURAGEOUS COMMENTS

ON ARAB POLICY TOWARDS THE PALESTINE QUESTION.

AND OUTSPOKEN COMMENTS ON VIETNAM AND COMMUNISM.

MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM CONTAINS

SUMMARIES OF THE OUTSTANDING PASSAGES. WHICH MAY

BE OF USE TO I R D AND OTHERS.

FO PASS RABAT 21.

→OSFA.

1076/67 —

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107

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cypher/OTA

[Distribution Heading]

FROM Tel Aviv TO Rabat

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 445 D M

[Date] 27 Aug R M

Repeated to NB para. 3

[Priority]

A.L. Southern 30.VIII
I have informed Mr. Lord Benham informally + hope that I can put it in a confidential paper shortly. F.O. agrees with Tel Aviv.
C. of A. I.O. 30/8
JMW 29/8

CONFIDENTIAL.

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM TEL AVIV.

ADDSD TO FO TEL 975 OF 27/8

REPTD UKMIS NYORK GENEVA NTON TRIPOLI BENGHAZI

KUWAIT BAHRAIN(AGENCY) KHARTOUM JEDDA RABAT

TUNIS JERUSALEM AMMAN CAIRO ALGIERS

YR TEL 1954.

REFUGEES.

IN ADDITION TO ACTION REPORTED IN MYTEL 965 I

HAD OPPORTUNITY TO URGE EXTENSION OF DEADLINE ON

ALLON ON AUG 24 AND (IN COMPANY WITH MR JEREMY

THORPE) ON SHIMONPERES THAT NIGHT. FORMER

WAS, AS USUAL, HARD LINE, BUT UNCOMFORTABLE

WHILE LATTER WAS RECEPTIVE (THOUGH I CANNOT

ASSESS WHETHER HE CAN GET DAYAN TO INFLUENCE

ANY GOVT DECISION). JEREMY THORPE RAISED THE

SUBJECT WITH ALL MINISTERS HE MET AND TODAYS

Press

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PRESS CARRIES CALL BY HIM TO ISRAEL TO LIVE UP

TO HER HUMANITARIAN REPUTATION.

2. I SAW MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE YESTERDAY AND

LEARNED HE HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO MAKE AN OFFICIAL

APPROACH (HIS FIRST NON-PERSONAL ONE). HE WAS

GOING UP TO JERUSALEM IN THE AFTERNOON TO

CARRY THESE OUT. BUT DOUBTED IF HE COULD RAISE

ANYONE BUT A JUNIOR OFFICIAL ON A SATURDAY. HE

THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE THAT MATTER MIGHT BE

DISCUSSED IN CABINET TODAY. THIS MORNING HE

TOLD ME HE HAD ONLY SEEN ASSISTANT AMERICAN DESK

OFFICER AND EVEN AT THAT LEVEL HAD DRAWN

CONCLUSION THAT ISRAEL POSITION WAS HARDENING

(CF. HIS VIEWS IN MYTEL 955).

3. TODAYS PRESS BREAKS STORY OF AMERICAN

APPROACH IN WTON (WTON TEL 2768) AND OF U THANTS

MOVE. RESULT HAS BEEN HARDENING IN PRESS LINE.

I STILL BELIEVE IT WILL NOT PAY FOR US TO GIVE

PUBLICITY GRATUITOUSLY BUT SINCE WE HAVE BEEN

SCOOPED LIKE THIS, I DO NOT THINK ANY HARM WOULD

BE DONE IF ALL ARAB POSTS WISH TO INFORM GOVTS

/privately

PRIVATELY THAT WE HAD STARTED OFFICIAL

REPRESENTATIONS ON AUG 23RD (IE BEFORE AMERICANS).

WERE CONTINUING WITH THEM DESPITE APPARENT

REBUFF TO AMERICANS AND WOULD CONTINUE TO

THE END.

4. I HAVE TODAY COMPLAINED TO MFA AT LACK OF ANY

OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO MY REPRESENTATIONS OF

AUG. 23RD. I SAID SAID I NOW HAD/ INSTRUCTIONS

TO TALK TO THE P M IN MR EBANS ABSENCE. I WAS

TOLD IT WAS LIKELY / THAT I WOULD / RECEIVE A

REACTION BY TOMORROW. I SAID THAT IF THIS WAS

FAVOURABLE I WOULD NOT PRESS TO SEE MR ESKHOL. BUT IF

IT WERE UNFAVOURABLE I WOULD WISH TO SEE HIM

ON AUG 29TH/. I ALSO TOLD RIVLIN (ACTING HEAD

COMMONWEALTH DIVISION) THAT ISRAEL WAS REALLY

PREPARING ANOTHER SAMUA FOR HERSELF I.E. A

SERIOUS LOSS OF WORLD SYMPATHY OVER AN ACTION

WHICH WAS TOTALIY IRRELEVANT TO ISRAELS

INTERESTS OR SECURITY.

5. MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE INFORMED ME YESTERDAY OF

RED CROSS VIEWS REPORTED IN AMMAN TEL 1043.

F C PASS RABAT 4. SOSFA

CONFIDENTIAL

1076

British Embassy,

TUNIS

(1075)

28 August, 1967

King Hussein looked very dashing and chipper when he emerged from his Caravelle for a 24 hour visit on Sunday 20 August. We doubt, however, whether his coming here will have advanced the Arab cause much.

2. Clare Hollingworth had it from a Libyan Minister in Tripoli that King Hussein's main objectives during his visit here would be as follows:

(i) to enlist President Bourguiba's support for his request for financial aid from Saudi Arabia;

(ii) to bring the trade boycott and oil embargo against the U.S. and the U.K. to an end;

(iii) to build up a united front of moderate Arab powers at the forthcoming second round of the Arab Summit Conference at Khartoum.

3. As regards the third of these points, Akram Zuaytir told a member of the staff with whom he is on close terms that the King had come here as part of the mission to urge Arab leaders to a consensus vis-à-vis Israel. The basis of this would be that the Arab states would offer an affirmation of non-belligerence, plus freedom of navigation both in the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal, in return for an Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied as a result of the fighting. If Israel would not agree, the only expedient the Jordanians could think of was the well-worn routine of sending delegations from all the Arab countries to tour the world to explain the Arab cause, plus the continuation of Arab hostility towards Israel. If the other Arab states failed to agree on the King's scheme, he would reserve his own freedom of action (though to what ends was not revealed: presumably the Jordanians are keeping quiet on this part of the scheme).

4. A whimsical note was contributed by Akram Zuaytir's account of President Bourguiba's indignation against the Chinese for their barbarous treatment of foreign missions in Peking. "Tell me", said Zuaytir to our Vice-Consul, "what happened to your Embassy on 5 June?"

/5.

P. L. V. Mallet, Esq.,
North and East African Department,
Foreign Office

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 6 SEP 1967

5. I am sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries at Amman, Beirut, Jedda, Khartoum, Tripoli, Benghazi, Algiers and Rabat.

(C. T. Brant)

CONFIDENTIAL

Chancery,
Rabat

With the compliments of

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
EMBASSY

Para. 2 is more or less what we heard.

(1075)

A.L. Southorn 6.IX

C cr. [illegible] Yes PW.

[illegible] 11/9

BRITISH EMBASSY
TUNIS

28 August, 1967

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cy/CAT 'A'

[Distribution Heading]

FROM FO TO RABAT.

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 450

[Date] 28 AUG.

D M

R M

Repeated to

[Priority] ROUTINE

A.L. Southorn 30.VIII
C.a.d. Ken 29/8
W.S. 30/8

CONFIDENTIAL.

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM TEL AVIV ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 976 OF 28 AUGUST

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK UKMIS GENEVA WASHINGTON TRIPOLI BENGHAZI KUWAIT BAHRAIN (AGENCY) KHARTOUM JEDDA RABAT TUNIS JERUSALEM AMMAN CAIRO ALGIERS.

DISTRIBUTION

MY TELNO 975:

REFUGEES.

RIVLIN TELEPHONED AGAIN LAST NIGHT TO SAY MR. EBAN WOULD BREAK HIS HOLIDAY TO SEE ME AT 10 AM ON 29 AUGUST IN HERTZLIYA.

2. HE SAID THAT CABINET HAD TAKEN A DECISION ABOUT RETURN OF REFUGEES WHICH WAS ~~UNQUOTE~~ "A GREAT STEP FORWARD" ~~UNQUOTE~~. BUT WOULD NOT DISCLOSE /DETAILS

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

on the/

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

ON THE TELEPHONE. CABINET DECISION WILL NOT BE

MADE PUBLIC FOR ANOTHER THREE DAYS, BUT

MR. REMEZ HAS BEEN INFORMED BY TELEGRAM SO THAT

HE CAN GIVE YOU FULL DETAILS IN CONFIDENCE AT

THE MEETING WHICH ISRAEL M F A UNDERSTAND HAS

BEEN BEEN ARRANGED WITH YOU TODAY.

3. IF ISRAEL CABINET DECISION DOES NOT, IN FACT,

MEET YOUR REQUIREMENTS, I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL

FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON WHAT TO SAY TO MR EBAN TO

ARRIVE HERE BY 090 HRS GMT ON AUGUST 29.

FO PASS RABAT 5.

BOSFA

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cy /CAT'A'

[Distribution Heading]

FROM F.O. TO RABAT.

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 451 D M

[Date] 28 AUG. R M

Repeated to

[Priority] PRIORITY

A.L. Southorn 29. VIII
L.O. 29/8
C. [illegible] 29/8

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO. 1866 OF 28/8

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK UKMIS GENEVA WASHINGTON TRIPOLI BENGHAZI BAHRAIN (AGENCY) KHARTOUM JEDDA RABAT TUNIS JERUSALEM AMMAN CAIRO ALGIERS.

DISTRIBUTION

:YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 976: REFUGEES.

NO (REPEAT NO) APPOINTMENT HAS BEEN MADE FOR MR. REMEZ TO SEE THE FOREIGN SECRETARY EITHER TODAY OR TOMORROW. PLEASE THEREFORE REPORT BY FLASH TELEGRAM THE RESULTS OF YOUR CONVERSATION WITH MR. EBAN.

2. IF ISRAEL GOVERNMENT~S DECISION IS NOT SATISFACTORY WE MAY WISH TO CONSIDER ~~MLSIDER~~ EARLIER PUBLICITY FOR OUR DEMARCHE. SOSFA

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
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Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

CY/CAT 'A'

[Distribution Heading]

FROM FO TO LABAT

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 453 D M

[Date] 28 AUG. R M

Repeated to

[Priority] PRIORITY

A.L. Sowton 30.VIII
C.a.d'Avigdor 30/8
D.O. 31/8
F.E. Hum 31/8

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM KHARTOUM.

ADDSD TO F.O. TELNO 479 OF 28 AUGUST RPTD TO ARAB

POSTS P C ADEN (PERSONAL) TEL AVIV AND SAVING

TO WTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

DISTRIBUTION

THE FOREIGN MINISTERS COMPLETED THEIR BUSINESS ON 27 AUG. THEY APPEAR TO HAVE DONE VERY LITTLE MORE THAN PASS ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THEIR EARLIER CONFERENCE AND OF THE BAGHDAD CONFERENCE TO THE SUMMIT. THERE HAS BEEN SOME DISCUSSION OF THE IRAQI PROPOSAL FOR A THREE MONTH STOPPAGE OF OIL EXPORTS AND IT IS WIDELY REPORTED IN THE LOCAL PRESS THAT THE SAUDI ARABIAN, LIBYAN AND KUWAITI DELEGATES EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS. THE ALGERIANS SULKED AND ARE SAID TO HAVE ABSENTED THEMSELVES DURING THE DEBATE ON OIL. THE ~~COALBFOM~~

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

Conference/

CYUF #1 CONFERENCE FINALLY ACCEPTED UNANIMOUSLY THE FOLLOWING HEADINGS FOR DISCUSSION BY THE SUMMIT WHICH HAD BEEN DRAWN UP BY A COMMITTEE COMPRISING THE SUDANESE LIBYAN AND JORDANIAN DELEGATES, AND WHICH IS OBVIOUSLY INTENDED TO EMBRACE ALL MATTERS DISCUSSED AT KHARTOUM AND BAGHDAD WITHOUT COMMITTING ANY STATE OF GROUP OF STATES TO A PARTICULAR LINE OF ACTION.

"(1) POLITICAL, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC MEASURE TO COUNTER THE IMPACT OF THE AGGRESSION (2) LIQUIDATION OF MILITARY BASES IN ARAB TERRITORY (3) THE ROLE OF THE ARAB ECONOMY IN THE LIGHT OF THE BAGHDAD CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION

(4) ARAB POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE".

2. THE SUMMIT IS BILLED TO START AT 7 PM ON 29 AUGUST. KING HUSSEIN, THE FIRST ARRIVAL, IS EXPECTED AT 6 PM ON 28 AUGUST. NASSER SALLA AND ARIF ARE EXPECTED TO COME TOGETHER TO CAIRO SOMETIME DURING 29 AUGUST. KING IDRIS AND BOURGEIBA WILL NOT ATTEND "FOR HEALTH REASONS" BUT WILL BE REPRESENTED. THERE IS NO LOCAL CONFIR- MATION OF THE B B C REPORT

thanks

THAT BOUMEDIENE AND ATAAI HAVE DECIDED NOT TO COME.

3. SEE M I F T FOR LATEST MOVES CONCERNING THE YEMEN.

1
13/10/67

F.O. PASS ARAB POSTS U/N

1076

90 Rabat

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

JEDDA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 566 28 August 1967

AJS 6.IX

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 566 of 28 August, repeated for information to Amman, Kuwait, Bahrain and Saving to Tel Aviv, U.K. Mission New York, Washington, Beirut, Tripoli, Tehran, Benghazi, Tunis and Rabat.

Your telegram No. 1249: Jordan.

King Feisal received me on 27 August and I spoke in accordance with your instructions.

2. The King listened carefully and reacted well to your message. He was particularly glad to have the assurance contained in the first sentence of paragraph 1 of your telegram.

3. However, he interrupted me on two or three occasions to make the following main points:

(i) 'Communism': Jordan and Saudi Arabia are the sole barriers remaining in the Middle East against Communism and it is essential that both countries should receive every support from Britain and the United States. Jordan needs this help most. The British have to persuade the Americans to do more than they are doing since the latter are richer and more powerful. King Hussein badly needs arms by the Americans are dragging their feet. There is a definite risk that Hussein might be tempted to go to the Russians for arms if the West are unwilling to supply his needs. Hussein had hinted as much to Feisal during the former's recent visit to Saudi Arabia.

(ii) 'Israel': Feisal recognises that we are doing our best with the Israelis, but we and especially the Americans must do more. It is essential for Jordan's survival that the Israelis should give up Jerusalem and the West Bank. If these are not restored to Jordan, Hussein and his regime - and indeed Jordan as a country - well might collapse.

(iii) Feisal fully agrees with us (your paragraph 3) that Hussein should not risk the dangers of attempting negotiations with the Israelis "in present circumstances". Hussein must first strengthen and stabilise his position and put his country back on its feet. This he can only do by getting back the territories that the Israelis have taken from him. Once this has been acheived a "truce" could be established between Israel and Jordan. In reply to my question "what then?" Feisal was vague but appeared to have in mind that at this point it would be easier for Hussein to establish some kind of 'modus vivendi' with Israel, which might lead to an eventual tacit settlement. Commenting on the last sentence of your paragraph 3 Feisal said that Hussein had indeed told his people and his friends of the real nature of Jordan's problems and this appeared to have strengthened his position.

Faisal still distrusts Egypt.

(iv) Nasser had only encouraged Hussein to negotiate with Israel because he wanted to place Hussein in an impossible position and thereby secure his downfall.

/(v)

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY -6 SEP 1967

(v) The Arab Summit Meeting would see a severe tug of war between the extremists and the moderates. It was a pity therefore that Bourguiba had felt it necessary to make his recent statement, this was not helpful at the present juncture and could only accentuate the divisions of the Arab world thereby making the task of the moderates more difficult.

Foreign Office please pass to Amman 64 and Saving to Tel Aviv 6, U.K. Mission New York 18, Washington 42, Beirut 31, Tripoli 7, Tehran 4, Benghazi 3, Tunis 5 and Rabat 5.

Mr. Man

Sent 1330Z 28 August
Recd 1656Z 28 August

[Repeated as requested]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.O. Eastern Dept.
N.E.A.D.
D.D. & P.U.S.D.
News Dept.
Arabian Dept.
U.N.D.
C.O. M.E.W.U.N.D.

EEEEE

1076

F.O. TEL. No. 91 ..... SAVING TO ..... Rabat

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NO.2787
CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
29 AUGUST 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO.2787 OF 29 AUGUST
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV UKMIS NEW YORK U.K. MISSION GENEVA AMMAN AND JERUSALEM AND SAVING TO TRIPOLI BENGHAZI KUWAIT BAHRAIN (AGENCY) KHARTOUM JEDDA RABAT TUNIS CAIRO AND ALGIERS.

TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO.976 TO FOREIGN OFFICE: REFUGEES.

MR. EBAN HAS TOLD THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN TEL AVIV THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE NOW WILLING TO ACCEPT ALL REFUGEES FOR WHOM APPLICATIONS ARE APPROVED REGARDLESS OF THE PREVIOUSLY IMPOSED TIME LIMIT.
2. HE DID NOT HOWEVER MAKE IT CLEAR WHETHER THIS APPLIED ONLY TO APPLICATIONS ALREADY APPROVED OR WHETHER THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE WILLING TO PROCESS ALL THE APPLICATIONS IN THEIR HANDS. MR. BARBOUR IS BEING ASKED TO SEEK CLARIFICATION ON THIS POINT.

F O PASS IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV 120 PRIORITY UK MISSION GENEVA 203 AMMAN 108 AND JERUSALEM 17 AND SAVING TO TRIPOLI 22 BENGHAZI 15 KUWAIT 50 BAHRAIN (AGENCY) 1 KHARTOUM 10 JEDDA 31 RABAT 8 TUNIS 9 CAIRO 22 AND ALGIERS 8.

AZS 6.1X

SIR P. DEAN

SENT AT 29/1653Z
RECD AT 29/1654Z

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY
-6 SEP 1967

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1076.

Minutes

Oil Embargo

Please see attached article 'UK beat Arab Oil Ban in July' (Financial Times, 26 August 1967)

2. This paints a much rosier picture than the pessimism of Guidance telegrams at the time of the M.E. Crisis, and although the line of guidance was then that the Arab oil ban would have "little practical effect" it was not a line which at that time one was able to take both much conviction.

3. Now it is a different picture; and it is certainly in every way in the interests of the Arabs to understand that we can get along without their oil much more easily than they seem to think.

J.B. Murray-Rust.

29 August 1967

~~Esler~~

~~Coles~~ M/E

~~Day~~ M/S

O.S. M/S 31-VIII

The effective switching of supplies by the international oil industry (which those expected, could not be altogether counted on as the outset) has taken

1076/67

[Guidances 162, 166, 176]

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

62805 (5640) A.O.St.

taken upon if the sting
out of the selective Embargo.
Meanwhile several of the
main Arab producing
countries have no
appetite for a more
thorough-going shut down
on oil supplies.

3rd August

I agree that it is worth while
for the Arabs to understand that we
can get along without their oil rather
than they think. However in the
absence of official guidance I don't
think we can or should do anything
"initiative-wise." We might well use the gist
of our article & one that appeared in
the Economist recently.

The Economist article pointed
out that the U.K. balance of payments
in the 2nd quarter of 1967 was
actually benefiting from the oil blockade.
We were not buying so much oil
abroad and using stocks so saving
foreign currency. On the other hand
increased tanker hirings meant
that our own shipping was earning
more foreign exchange.

4/9/67

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

FINANCIAL TIMES – 26 AUG 1967

U.K. beat Arab oil ban in July

BY CHRISTOPHER TUGENDHAT, ENERGY EDITOR

DESPITE the Arab embargo on oil sales to this country, Britain managed to cover most of its requirements from imports during July, according to figures in the latest edition of the Overseas Trade Accounts. By the end of the month the oil industry had largely readjusted its tanker schedules, and it is believed that the August figures will show that stocks are now being rebuilt.

Total imports during July amounted to 5.2m. tons, compared with 7.4m. tons in July, 1966, and 6.7m. tons in June 196[illegible]

Small quantities of oil from Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq entered Britain during July, but these were shipped before the crisis began. The vast bulk of the supplies came from Iran and Venezuela.

Venezuela was the main supplier, with 1.3m. tons against Iran's 1.2m. tons. This represents a significant change from July, 1966, when Venezuela supplied only 457,000 tons and Iran 321,000 tons.

There has also been a striking increase in imports from the U.S., which rose from 22,000 tons in July, 1966, to 347,000 tons last month.

No Soviet oil reached Britain during July, but it is interesting to note that during the first seven months of the year imports of Russian oil amounted to 26,000 tons, compared with 12,000 tons in the corresponding period of 1966. The Government does not usually grant licences for the import of Soviet oil, and only certain specialist types are allowed to come in. The fact that the quantities involved should have more than doubled is further evidence of the Soviet export drive.

c.f. para 4 of Guidance Tel 162 9 27/6/67

TELEX ◇ SERVICE

1076

PRODROME RABAT

FOR003 FOLON GPS100 3017[illegible] Z

ROUTINE PRODROME RABAT RTTWO E E E [illegible]

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM TEL AVIV
ADDRESSED TO F O TELNO 07[illegible]

see below.

See also tel below.
A.L. Southam 31/V
C d'A [illegible] 1/9
Co. [illegible] 4/9

REF MY TELNO 077 OF 29/8. REFUGEES. TODAYS MA ARIV (EVENING NEWSPAPER) REPORTS THAT FOREIGN MINISTRY SOURCES LET IT BE KNOWN THIS MORNING THAT REFUGEES WHO HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED PERMITS TO RETURN TO THE WEST BANK BUT WHO DO NOT MANAGE TO DO SO BY 31 AUGUST WILL BE ADMITTED AFTER THAT DATE.

2. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THERE WILL BE ABOUT 10,000 UNUSED PERMITS ON 31 AUGUST.

3. MA ARIV STATES THAT THIS DECISION WAS TAKEN IN SUCH A WAY AS TO AVERT INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON ISRAEL WITHOUT GOING BACK ON HER DECISION NOT TO EXTEND THE DATE FOR RETURN OF THE REFUGEES BEYOND 31 AUGUST.

4. IT IS ALSO REPORTED THAT THE GOVT IS CONSIDERING A DECISION ABOUT THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO THE WEST BANK WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE FAMILY REUNION SCHEME.

5. ARTICLE CONCLUDES BY SAYING THAT AN (OFFICIAL) ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE GOVTS STEP WILL APPARENTLY BE PUBLISHED TOMORROW (WED 30 AUG) IN JERUSALEM.
SOSFA

TPD 301753Z MBI

PRODROME RABAT

0076.

INWARD TELEGRAM

AZS 31-VIII

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cypher/CAT A

[Distribution Heading]

FROM 7.0 TO Rabat

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 454 D M

[Date] 29 Aug. R M

Repeated to

[Priority]

CONFIDENTIAL FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM TEL AVIV.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 977

OF 29 AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION UKMIS

NEW YORK GENEVA WASHINGTON TRIPOLI BENGHAZE

BAHRAIN (AGENCY) KHARTOUM JEDDA RABAT TUNIS

JERUSALEM AMMAN CAIRO ALGIERS.

"A"

YOUR TELNO 1865: REFUGEES.

DISTRIBUTION

MR EBAN BEGAN BY SAYING A TELEGRAM HAD GONE TO MR REMES TO SPEAK TO YOU ORALY IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO GIVE YOU MR EBANS BACKGROUND THINKING ON THE GENERAL SITUATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HER NEIGHBOURS (MYTEL 525 NOTAL). NSR rec'd.

2. WITH REGARD TO REFUGEES THE GOVT HAD DECIDED THAT:-

(A) ALL REFUGEES IN POSSESSION OF APPROVED APPLICATIONS ISSUED PRIOR TO 31 AUGUST

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

/would

WOULD BE PERMITTED TO RETURN. ISRAEL WOULD GO

ON PROCESSING APPLICATIONS UP TO 31 AUGUST

(BUT THESE WOULD ONLY AMOUNT TO ANOTHER

2-3000) MEBAN WAS VAGUE ABOUT HOW LONG

THE PERIOD FOR RETURN WOULD BE POSSIBLY

TWO WEEKS OR SO BUT WHEN THE GOVT

ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE HE DID NOT THINK

ANY FURTHER DEADLINE WOULD BE SPECIFIED AND

IT MIGHT WELL BE THAT RETURNEES IN THIS

CATEGORY WOULD BE GIVEN QUITE A LONG TIME

TO MAKE UP THEIR MINDS.

(B) THE FAMILY REUNION SCHEME WOULD BE CONTINUED

INDEFINITELY.

3. I AGAIN RAN OVER THE GROUND COVERED IN YOUR

TEL 1836. MY TEL 965 AND AMMAN TELS 1025 1030

AND 1046. I SAID IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THE OUTSIDE

WORLD COULD WELL CONSIDER THAT ISRAEL HAD BEEN

UNNECESSARILY RESTRICTIVE: THEY WOULD NOT HAVE

PROCESSED ALL THE APPLICATION FORMS NECESSARY FOR

THEIR RETURN OF. SAY. A NATIONAL FIGURE OF

120.000 REFUGEES AND THE WORLD WOULD SEE THAT

THEY HAD PREVENTED SOME HUNDRED-THOUSAND ODD FROM

COMING BACK (WHETHER THESE PEOPLE REALLY WISHED

TO DO SO OR NOT). I URGED THAT THIS SHOULD NOT BE

THE LAST WORD. IT SEEMED ALL TOO OBVIOUS THAT IN ANOTHER TWO OR THREE WEEKS THE ISRAEL GOVT WOULD AGAIN COME UNDER STRONG WORLD CRITICISM AND MIGHT WELL HAVE TO TAKE FURTHER STEPS TO FACILITATE THE RETURN OF REFUGEES. MR EBAN INDICATED ASSENT AND SEEMED TO ACCEPT THAT POSSIBLE FURTHER CONCESSIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE AT A LATER DATE BUT THOUGHT THESE COULD BE BEST ACHIEVED BY A DIRECT DIALOGUE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN.

4. I SAID, IN PARTICULAR, I SIMPLY COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE ISRAELIS HAD NOT DONE SOMETHING TO BRING BACK EN MASSE (UNDERLINED) THE FORTY ODD THOUSAND PROFESSIONAL REFUGEES FROM JERICHO, THEREBY GAINING CREDIET WITH UNRWA. MR EBAN SAID HE COULD NOT SEE WHY UNRWA DID NOT MAKE MORE PERMANENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THESE PEOPLE TO STAY ON THE EAST BANK. I SAID I THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS AN UNREASONABLE POINT OF VIEW. ALL THE FACILITIES EXISTED ALREADY ON THE WEST BANK AND WHY SHOULD UNRWA GO TO ALL THAT EXTRA TROUBLE AND EXPENSE. ON INTERNATIONAL MONEY. JUST BECAUSE THE ISRAELIS WANTED TO MAKE THINGS DIFFICULT.

5. WITH REGARD TO PUBLICITY I SAID HE WOULD HAVE NOTICED THAT WE HAD NOT (AS DISTINCT FROM

/the Americans

THE AMERICANS AND U THANT) PUBLICISED OUR REPRESENTATIONS. I FELT THAT NOW YOU MIGHT WELL WISH TO LET THE ARAB STATES KNOW THAT WE HAD NOT BEEN BEHIND THE OTHERS IN REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF THE REFUGEES. I THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE YOU WOULD WISH TO MAKE SOME STATEMENT TOMORROW. OR AGAIN YOU MIGHT WISH TO AWAIT UNTIL THE ISRAELIS HAD MADE THEIR ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT THEIR NEW ARRANGEMENTS ON 31 AUGUST. GIVE YOUR VIEWS ON HOW FAR THESE ARRANGEMENTS WERE SATISFACTORY OR NOT AND. AT THAT TIME. SAY THAT YOU HAD BEEN URGING THE ISRAEL GOVT TO EXTEND THE DATE FOR AT LEAST THE LAST TEN DAYS. MR EBAN MERELY ASKED THAT YOU WOULD NOT REVEAL WHAT THE ISRAELI ARRANGEMENTS WERE. BEFORE THE ISRAEL GOVT ITSELF MADE THESE PUBLIC.

FO PASS RABAT S.

SOSFA.

1076

30/8/67.

CONFIDENTIAL

British Assistance to Jordan

In the period immediately after the war the British Government sent emergency shipments of blankets, tents and medical supplies to Jordan and also made a grant of £½ million sterling for urgent reconstruction and rehabilitation projects. They also made a further emergency grant to U.N.W.R.A. of $½ million. This was over and above their regular contribution of $4.5 million for the current year. In the meantime the normal British aid programme to Jordan, comprising both development loans and budgetary aid, continues.

More recently King Hussein told the British Government of his urgent need to re-equip the Royal Jordanian Air Force with Hawker Hunter aircraft and the British have done what they can to assist over this. Although Hunters are no longer being manufactured the British decided to reduce the Royal Air Force's operational capacity and to release from the R.A.F. three Hunter aircraft to send them to Jordan. They hope that these aircraft, together with four other Hunters which are at present being refurbished in the United Kingdom, will help to form a nucleus around which the Royal Jordanian Air Force can be rebuilt.

The British Foreign Minister, George Brown, has already made statements in the United Nations and in Parliament condemning the Israeli separation of Jerusalem from the rest of the West bank and stressing the need for Israeli withdrawal from the territories that they have occupied. The British Government made representations to the Israelis urging greater flexibility in the arrangements for the return of refugees to the west bank, and they have reason to

/believe

Handed to M. Larbi Bennani, M.f.A., this afternoon.
AJS 31.VIII

CONFIDENTIAL

believe that these representations had some effect in persuading the Israelis to make an offer for the return of these refugees at all. The British started official representations on 23 August to press the Israelis to abolish the deadline of 31 August that they had set for the return of these refugees.

The British Government have also give careful thought to the problem that King Hussein faces in being unable to secure an early return of any of his lost territories when agreeing to negotiations with Israel. They consider that he is right in present circumstances not to risk the dangers of attempting such a negotiation. They agree on the importence of his informing both the people of Jordan and Jordan's friends of the real nature of the problems his country faces as this appears to be a necessary first step towards any recovery of the occupied territories.

30 August 1967.

CONFIDENTIEL

Traduction non-officielle

Assistance Britannique à la Jordanie

Dans la période qui a suivi immédiatement la guerre, le Gouvernement Britannique a envoyé d'urgence des lots de couvertures, tentes et médicaments à la Jordanie, et a également octroyé un montant d'un demi-million de livres sterling pour des projets urgents de reconstruction et de réadaptation. Il a également alloué d'urgence un montant supplémentaire à l'U.N.W.R.A. d'un demi-million de dollars, en plus de sa contribution régulière annuelle de quatre millions et demi de dollars. Entretemps, le programme normal d'aide à la Jordanie, comprenant des prêts de développement et aide budgétaire, continue.

Plus récemment, le Roi Hussein a fait connaître au Gouvernement Britannique son besoin urgent de ré-équiper les Forces Aériennes Jordaniennes avec des avions Hawker Hunter, et le Gouvernement Britannique a fait tout son possible pour lui venir en aide. Quoique les avions Hunter ne sont plus fabriqués, le Gouvernement Britannique décida de réduire la capacité technique de la Royal Air Force en envoyant trois de ses avions Hunter à la Jordanie. Le Gouvernement Britannique espère que ces avions, ainsi que quatre autres avions Hunter qui sont actuellement remis à neuf au Royaume Uni, permettront de constituer un noyau autour duquel les Forces Aériennes de la Jordanie pourront être reconstruites.

Le Ministre Britannique aux Affaires Etrangères, Monsieur George Brown, a déjà fait des déclarations aux Nations Unies et au Parlement condamnant la séparation par Israël de Jérusalem du reste de la rive occidentale, et soulignant la nécessité d'un retrait israélien des territoires qu'il a occupés. Le Gouvernement Britannique a fait des représentations à Israël, l'exhortant à faire preuve de plus de flexibilité dans ses mesures pour le retour des réfugiés à la rive occidentale, et il a des

/..raisons

raisons de croire que lesdites représentations ont contribué à persuader les Israéliens à faire même une offre pour le retour de ces réfugiés. C'est le 23 Août que les Britanniques ont entamé des représentations officielles pour presser les Israéliens à abolir la date extrême du 31 Août qu'ils avaient fixée pour le retour des réfugiés.

Le Gouvernement Britannique a étudié avec soin le problème auquel le Roi Hussein fait face de ne pouvoir obtenir le retour rapide de ses territoires perdus, s'il accepte de négocier avec Israël. Il considère que, dans les circonstances actuelles, le Roi Hussein a raison de ne pas risquer les dangers de tenter une telle négociation. Il est d'accord sur l'importance qu'il y a d'informer le peuple et les amis de la Jordanie de la véritable nature des problèmes de ce pays, car cela semble constituer le premier pas vers toute récupération des territoires occupés.

Le 30 Août 1967.

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cypher ICA. A

[Distribution Heading]

FROM 7.0. TO RABAT.

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 460

D M

[Date] 30 Aug

R M

Repeated to

[Priority] PRIORITY.

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM KHARTOUM.

ADDSD TO F O TEL NO 194 OF 30 AUG.

RFI TO ALL ARAB POSTS HC ADEN PERSONAL TEL AVIV

NTOF AND UKMIS NEW YORK (ALL PRIORITY).

M I P T.

THE SUDANESE ARE DELIGHTED THAT THEIR FATIENT

EFFORTS TO CONVENE A SUMMIT HAVE AT LAST BEEN

REWARDED. THEY ARE NOT MUCH CONCERNED AT THE

ABSENCE OF KING HASSAN AND BOURGUIBA (THE LATTER~S

RECENT SPEECH SEE TUNIS TELNO 249 HAS BEEN

SUPRESSED HERE). BUT THEY ARE DISAPPOINTED AND

IRRITATED AT THE ABSENCE OF BOUMEDDIENE AND

ATASSI.

2. AS I SEE IT, ALGERIAN AND SYRIAN SULKING MAY

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ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

/expose

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

EXPOSE NASSER~S REVOLUTIONARY FLANK AND MAY

CONSEQUENTLY DISSUADE HIM FROM GOING AHEAD WITH

ANY FORM OF ~~QUOTE~~ "POLITICAL SOLUTION" ~~UNQUOTE~~

SUGGESTED TO HIM BY TITO AND THE RUSSIANS. UNLESS

HIS AND JORDAN~S ECONOMIC PLIGHT LEAVES HIM NO

OPTION BUT TO SEEK SOME FORM OF ACCOMMODATION

WITH ISRAEL.

3. IF THIS PREDICTION IS CORRECT THE MAIN TOPICS

LIKELY TO BE DISCUSSED AND RECORDED ARE THE

IRAQI PROPOSAL FOR AN OIL EMBARGO, THE YEMEN

ISSUE AND PROPOSALS FOR GREATER ARAB ECONOMIC AND

MILITARY UNITY: THE PROBLEM OF DISLODGING THE

ISRAELIS MAY WELL BE OBSCURED IN THE FLOOD OF

RHETORIC, BUT IT IS BOUND TO BE DISCUSSED.

ENLISTMENT OF UN ACTION, DISCREETLY SOUGHT, SEEMS

THE MOST LOGICAL NEXT STEP.

4. NASSER IS THE HERO OF THE HOUR IN KHARTOUM:

THE PRO-NASSERITE P D P PARTY AND THEIR EXTREMIST

ALLIES ARE HAVING A FIELD DAY AND AZHARI AND

MAHGOUB ARE BASKING IN REFLECTED GLORY. THE

OPPOSITION INCLUDING THE SOUTHERNERS HAVE UTTERED

SOME CAREFUL CRITICISM OF UNSEEMLY HERO WORSHIP

OF A FOREIGN RULER. BUT THEY WILL BE FORCED TO

Hoskins

REMAIN MORE OR LESS MUTE IN THE FACE OF THE

GENERAL ENTHUSIASM FOR NASSER AS LEADER OF THE

ARAB CAUSE. SOSFA.

SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX

D

1076

PRODROME RABAT
01 OP RABAT MOM DFDFTKS
PRODROME RABAT
PRODROME LONDON
FOR 002 FO LDN GRPS 216

IMMEDIATE KHARTOUM TO RABAT
TELNO 7-/N 30 AUGUST
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TEL NO 483 OF 30 H
AUGUST REPTD FOR INFORMATION TO ARAB POSTS, HC ADEN, TEL
AVIV, WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.
ARAB SUMMIT.
HEADS OF STATE OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES CONTINUED TO ARRIVE
THROUGHOUT 29 AUGUST AMID SCENES OF MUCH ENTHUSIASM, ESPECIALLY
FOR PRESIDENT NASSER. THE LAST TO ARRIVE WAS
BOUTEFLICA (ALGERIA). THE SUDANESE HAD GIVEN UP HOPE OF
ALGERIAN AND SYRIAN PARTICIPATING AND THE DECISION TO SEND
BOUTEFLICA MUST HAVE BEEN A LAST MINUTE ONE. THE SYRIAN
FOREIGN MINISTER, DR IBRAHIM MAKHOUS, DID NOT ATTEND THE
OPENING SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE AND IS NOW REPORTED TO HAVE
LEFT TO RETURN HOME.
2. NASSER ISSUED A STATEMENT AT THE AIRPORT THAT WAS
MAINLY A EULOGY ON SUDANESE LOYALTY TO THE CAUSE.
ON THE TASK CONFRTONTING THE SUMMIT HE SAID QUOTE IF THE PREPARATORY
WORK DONE FOR THIS CONFERENCE DOES NOT REALISE WHAT WE
EXPECTED, THAT WILL NOT DISCOURAGE US TO INSIST ON THE ATTEMPT
UNTIL THE END UNQUOTE, AND IN AN OBVIOUS
REEFERENCE TO ALGERIA AND SYRIA QUOTE WE HAVE COME FOR THIS TRIAL
KNOWING THAT SOME OF OUR VERY DEAR BROTHERS BELIEVE IN ADVANCE
THAT IT IS FUTILE UNQUOTE
3. AZHARI WAS ELECTED CHAIRMAN HIS SPEECH AT THE BEGINNING
OF THE CONFERENCE WAS ON GENERALITIES AND
CONTAINED NOTHING NEW.
4. SEE MIFT.

REDDAWAY

TPD 301745Z MBI

PSE IGNORE ALL AFTER REDDWAY

AJS 31.VIII

J.O. 31/8

PRODROME RABAT

1076

VL

AS 31.VIII

PRODROME RABATDRDFDF
PRODROME RABAT
PRODROME LONDONTKU V M

FOR1 FO LDN GRS420 310424Z

PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO RABAT
TELNO 024 30/AUGUST/1967
FOLLOWING RECD FROM TUNIS
ADDSD TO FO TELNO 253 OF 30 AUG RFI TO KHARTOUM 7 (IMMEDIATE)
BEIRUT 9 (PRIORITY) JEDDA 7 (PRIORITY) AMMAN 6 (PRIORITY)
KUWAIT 7 (PRIORITY) CAIRO 9 (PRIORITY) BENGHAZI 12 (PRIORITY)
RIPOLI 23 (PRIORITY) ALGIERS 19 (PRIORITY) RABAT 24 (PRIORITY)
TEL AVIV 8 (PRIORITY) WASHINGTON 15 (PRIORITY) PARIS 10
(PTY)
KHARTOUM SUMIT
OFFICIAL PARTY NESPAPER 'L'ACTION' TODAY COMES OUT WITH A
STRONG PLEA FOR 'CHOOSING PEACE' IN THE ARAB/ISRAEL SITUATION

2. LEADING EDITORIAL ARGUES IN STRONG TERMS THAT OF THE
TWO ALTERNATIVE POLICIES TOWARDS ISRAEL WAR OR PEACE WAR IS
NOW IMPOSSIBLE. THE ARAB STATES WOULD HAVE BENEFITTED IMMENSELY
HAD THEY PLAYED THE LAST CARD OPEN TO THEM AFTER 5 JUNE THAT
OF PEACE. THERE WAS HOWEVER STILL TIME TO SEIZE THIS LAST CHANCE
TO IMPROVE THE ARAB POSITION IN THE DIPLOMATIC BATTLE NOW
SHAPING AND TO ASSURE FINAL VICTORY.

TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX

SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX

3. THE MAIN PURPOSES IN CHOOSING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION WOULD BE (A) TO DEPRIVE ISRAELI PROPAGANDA OF ITS PRINCIPAL ARGUMENT ABANDONING SENSELESS SLOGANS OF 'TH EXTERMINATION OF ISRAEL' WOULD BREAK THE ARABS DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION AND GRATIFY THEIR STRONGEST SUPPORTERS - THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES THE NON-ALIGNED STATES AND THE MOSLEM STATES WHICH RECOGNISE ISRAEL PACIFICATION WOULD OBLIGE TEL AVIV TO MODERATE ITS APPETITE SEMI COLON IT WOULD REGAIN THE MAXIMUM OF THE TERRITORY LOST AFTER 5 JUNE ISRAEL ITSELF WOULD HAVE NO FURTHER PRETEXT FOR OCCUPYING THIS GROUND
(B) MAKING PEACE WOUL D ENTAIL SIMPLY A CHANGE OF METHOD IN THE DEFENCE OF A JUST CAUSE. THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE WOULD ONLY TRIUMPH IF THE ARAB COUNTRIES TURNED RESOLUTELY TOWARDS BUILDING UP THEIR OWN 'ECONOMIC ARMAMENT'
ISRAEL COULD NOT ALWAYS REMAIN DEAF TO APPEALS TO REASON AND CONTINUE TO DEFY INNUMERABLE UN RESOLUTIONS
NO PEACE COULD BE SUSTAINED ON THE HUMILIATIONF OF THE PEOPLE DEPRIVED OF ITS HOMELAND OR IF JUSTICE AND MORALITY WERE IGNOMINOUSLY DISDAINED

4. THE COMING DAYS AND WEEKS WOULD SHOW WHETHER THE HEADS OF ARAB STATES WOULD BE ABLE TO SEIZE THIS LAST CHANCE OFFERED THEM OR WHETHER THEY WOULD FOLLOW THE WAY TAKEN BY THEIR PREDECESSORS SINCE 1947.
IF THE CURRENT DISARRAY CONTINUED NONE COULD FORESEE WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THESE COUNTRIES TODAY TERRORISED BY ISRAEL OR TO THE WHOLE ARAB WORLD
MOREOVER IF THE PALESTINIANS CONTINUED TO BE ABANDONED TO ISRAELI DOMINATION SHOULD ONE BE SURPRISED IF THEY ONE DAY RESIGNED THEMSELVES TO DISCUSSION WITH THE AUTHORITIES IN TEL AVIV QUERY OR SHOULD ONE WISH THEM TO CONSTITUTE UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF KING HUSSEIN THAT JORDANO-PALESTINIAN KINGDOM URGED FOR SO LONG BY SOME QUERY NO ONE COULD BLAME THEM SINCE NONE COULD SAY THAT THEY HAD BEEN LEFT THE SLIGHTEST HOPE OF FINDING THROUGH ARAB SOLIDARITY THE RESCUE AWAITED FOR SO LONG
SOSFA ++

TPD 310433Z UC ++

PRODROME RABAT

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

C4 /CAT'A'

[Distribution Heading]

FROM F.O. TO LABAT.

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 464 D M

[Date] 1 SEPT. R M

Repeated to

[Priority] PRIORITY

A.L. Southam Ld. 1X
C a/f Tue 7/9
L.O. 4/9

CONFIDENTIAL.

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM KHARTOUM.

ADDRESSED TO F.O. TELEGRAM NO.490 OF 1 SEPTEMBER

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO ARAB POSTS H.C. ADEN

TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO WASHINGTON AND

UKMIS NEW YORK.

SUMMIT CONFERENCE

DISTRIBUTION

THE CONFERENCE CONTINUED IN CLOSED

SESSION ON 31 AUGUST. IT WILL MEET AGAIN THIS

MORNING TO CONSIDER THE TERMS OF THE COMMUNIQUE

WHICH WILL BE ANNOUNCED AT A PUBLIC MEETING THIS

EVENING.

2. OFFICIAL SOURCES HAVE BEEN SILENT ABOUT THE

PROCEEDINGS BUT ACCORDING TO WHAT MAY BE

MERELY SPECULATION IN THE LOCAL PRESS THE HEADS

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

of state/

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

OF STATE AGREED YESTERDAY THAT THE ISRAELIS COULD ONLY BE DISLODGED BY MILITARY FORCE AND THAT A POLITICAL SOLUTION WOULD NEED TO BE BACKED UP MILITARILY. THERE MAY HAVE BEEN DISCUSSION OF WHAT I UNDERSTAND FROM GOSSIP TO BE THE JORDANIAN PLAN OF CREATING A SEPARATE PALESTINIAN STATE COMPRISING THE WEST BANK OF THE JORDAN AND THE

GAZA STRIP. IT IS SAID THAT THE CONFERENCE DID NOT AGREE ON ~~BUCH~~ A FULL EMBARGO OF OIL TO THE WESTERN COUNTRIES ~~UNOUOTE~~ BUT AGREED ON PLANS FOR POLITICAL MILITARY, ECONOMIC, INFORMATION AND CULTURAL COOPERATION AS A BASIC FOR CONTINUING THE STRUGGLE AGAINST ZIONISM AND IMPERIALISM. AN ECONOMIC SUB-COMMITTEE IS SAID TO HAVE AGREED THAT ARAB COUNTRIES SHOULD FIND £125 MILLION TO MAKE GOOD THE LOSSES SUFFERED BY EGYPT AND JORDAN (HALF OF THIS AMOUNT TO BE PAID IMMEDIATELY AND THE OTHER HALF IN THREE MONTHS TIME). THERE HAS BEEN AN EXAMINATION OF THE OUTCOME OF THE U.N. EMERGENCY SESSION AND WAYS AND MEANS OF ADVANCING THE ARAB CAUSE INTERNATIONALLY.

Actually 135

3. THERE IS NO ECHO HERE OF THE BFC(SIC) REPORT OF A DECISION TO KEEP THE SUEZ CANAL CLOSED INDEFINITELY. BUT IT HAS A RING OF TRUTH. FOR

as long/

AS LONG AS THE ISRAELIS OCCUPY THE EAST BANK. THE CANAL MUST STAY CLOSED. SO THIS THREAT CAN BE UTTERED SAFELY.

4. SPECULATION AT THIS STAGE IS HAZARDOUS. BUT FROM THE WAY THINGS APPEAR TO BE GOING. IT SEEMS THAT A CONSENSUS WILL BE FOUND THAT WILL CONSIST MAINLY OF HIGH SOUNDING INVOCATIONS OF ARAB UNITY AND COOPERATION IN THE FACE OF THE ENEMY. EFFORTS TO FORCE THE OIL PRODUCING STATES TO APPLY AN EFFECTIVE BOYCOTT ARE LIKELY TO FAIL. BUT IN RETURN FOR PROTECTION OF THEIR OIL REVENUES THE OIL STATES WILL HAVE TO SHELL OUT CONSIDERABLE SUMS OF MONEY TO THE UAR AND JORDAN. I FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT THE RUMOURED JORDANIAN PROPOSAL FOR A PALESTINE STATE IS A STARTER.

5. ON THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF DISLODGING THE ISRAELIS. MY GUESS IS THAT THERE WILL BE LOUD SABRE RATTLING IN THE BEST ARAB MANNER. BUT NO POSITIVE LINE OF ACTION WILL EMERGE. IF. AS I THINK. SOMETHING MUST GIVE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. THERE WILL BE A COHERT AGREEMENT TO SEEK THROUGH INTERMEDARIES SOME SORT OF ~MODUS VIVENDI~ WITH ISRAEL AT THE FORTHCOMING U..N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY. IT IS STILL UNTHINKABLE THAT THE ARABS WILL AGREE TO negotiate/

NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH THE ISRAELIS AND FEW, IF ANY, WILL DARE TO GIVE SUPPORT TO THE BOURGUIBA LINE: BUT THEY MAY NOW BE PREPARED TO LOOK IN (GP UNDEC ? EARNEST) FOR AN HONEST BROKER TO SET THINGS MOVING AT UN.

F C PASS ARAB POSTS U/N. TEL AVIV 14.

SOSFA.

Communiqué de Presse

Vol. No. Date Le 1/9/1967

Table des Matières

RETOUR DES REFUGIES ARABES SUR LA RIVE

O CIDENTALE

Voici le texte d'une déclaration publiée par le Foreign Office la nuit dernière, jeudi 31 août 1967:

Le gouvernement britannique s'est sérieusement inquiété à la suite des indications de la Croix Rouge internationale selon lesquelles un très grand nombre de réfugiés qui ont demandé à retourner sur la rive occidentale ne pourront le faire avant le 31 août.

Il a, en conséquence, protesté à plusieurs reprises auprès du gouvernement d'Israel en demandant une prolongation de délai après cette date.

Il serait déplorable qu'à cause du manque d'un peu plus de temps, ce nouvel élément des riverains occidentaux qui ont fui de l'autre côté du Jourdain à la suite du récent conflit arabo-israelien, soit ajouté au problème déjà insoluble des réfugiés.

AMBASSADE DE GRANDE-BRETAGNE, RABAT
Section de Presse, Ave. Allal ben Abdallah. Tel. 209.05

السفارة البريطانية. الرباط
قسم الصحافة
شارع علال بن عبد الله
تليفون : 209.05

بيان صحفي

الرباط في 1 سبتمبر، 1967

عودة اللاجئين العرب الى الضفة الغربية

فيما يلي نص بيان اصدرته وزارة الخارجية البريطانية مساء الخميس في 31 اغسطس :

لقد قلقت الحكومة البريطانية قلقا كبيرا لبيانات الصليب الاحمر الدولي بان عددا كبيرا من اللاجئين الذين قدموا طلبات للعودة الى الضفة الغربية لن يستطيعوا القيام بذلك قبل تاريخ 31 اغسطس.

وبالتالي ، فانها في عدة مناسبات تقدمت بطلبات مستعجلة لدى الحكومة الاسرائيلية لكي تمدد ذلك الاجل .

وسيكون من المستغرب ، بسبب عدم توفر فترة قصيرة اضافية من الوقت، ان يضاف هذا العنصر الجديد من سكان الضفة الغربية الذين فرّوا عبر الاردن كنتيجة للحرب العربية ـ الاسرائيلية الاخيرة ، بصورة دائمة الى مشكلة اللاجئين السابقة الوجود والشديدة المراس.

Enter

C d'A dur. instable + all!

as ALS 1076

MAP-101

LA GRANDE BRETAGN PROTESTE AUPRES D'ISRAEL AU SUJET DU RETOUR DES REFUGIES.

LONDRES, 1ER SEPT .-(MAP)- DANS UNE DECLARATION DU FOREIGN OFFICE RENDUE PUBLIQUE LA NUIT DERNIERE, LE GOUVERNEMENT BRITANNIQUE S'ELEVE CONTRE LA DECISION D'ISRAEL DE N'ACCEPTER LE RETOUR DES REFUGIES AVANT LE 31 AOUT.

LA DECLARATION SE BASE A CE PROPOS SUR DES INDICATIONS DE LA CROIX ROUGE INTERNATIONALE.-(MAP)-

MO/BR+++++++18Z40+++++++++++++++

1076

F.O. TEL. No. ... SAVING TO ... Rabat

BY BAG SAVING TELEGRAM

COMMONWEALTH OFFICE AND FOREIGN OFFICE TO ABIDJAN AND CERTAIN OTHER MISSIONS

Telno 25 Saving 1 September 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Abidjan telegram No. 25 Saving of 1 September.
Repeated for information Saving to certain other posts.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 8 SEP 1967

MIDDLE EAST TALKING POINTS

31 August, 1967

"Kosygin, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, in his speech at the Special Emergency Session of the United Nations General Assembly, said that the Soviet Union throughout the 50 years of its history had viewed all nations, big and small, with respect and that all peoples had the right to establish their own independent national State. This is one of the basic principles of Soviet policy, inspired by which, we defined our attitude towards Israel as a State when in 1947 we voted for the United Nations resolution to establish two independent States in Palestine, the former British colony, a Jewish State and an Arab State. Consistent with this attitude, the Soviet Union subsequently instituted diplomatic relations with Israel". -- An article from Kommunist, broadcast by Moscow Radio in Arabic, 13 August.

President Bourguiba of Tunisia, in a speech on 23 August, said: "We know what "Quixotism" costs the régimeswhich describe themselves as revolutionary. However, while they are fighting the windmills of imperialism the people for whom they have the responsibility continue to live in black misery -- even the exercise of the most elementary liberties is forbidden them.

"The struggle against imperialism has become the sole preoccupation of these régimes. Thus over the Palestine affair they have followed a policy which consists of abandoning the substance for the shadow".

Other points he made on Arab policy were:-
"The State of Israel is recognised as such both by American and the Soviet Union, it is a member of the United Nations and its existence is only contested by the Arab States. In these conditions it is useless to insist obstinately on not recognising this reality. To claim to efface Israel from the map of the world is to condemn oneself to almost total isolation. The policy adopted up to now has alienated all sympathy from us ..."

"After the defeat which the Arab States have just experienced they must abandon the hopeless policy which they have pursued for the past 20 years. Whatever it costs, they will be forced to put an end to the state of war in order to recoup the territory conquered by Israel and to avoid even greater dangers. They must henceforth seek to bring their peoples up to the level of the strong and highly-

/developed

developed nations so that they will be capable one day of preventing all injustice and discouraging all aggression".

An Ekonomska Politika article, reported by the Yugoslav agency Tanyug on 19 August noted that during President Tito's visit to three Arab countries harmonsation of Yugoslav-Egyptian and Yugoslav-Arab attitudes was recorded, and even a definite plan of joint action, through the United Nations ... It seemed that both Moscow and W shington are now in a position to adjust their attitudes with greater flexibility in their search for a solution of the Middle Ea crisis ... It might be possible to reach a solution "on a wider platform which includes not an explicit attitude for recognition of Israel, but perhaps a more realistic attitude to the fact of its existence".

Soviet exploration uncovered nearly 1,000 million tons of oil reserves in Northern Syria, "a tempting morsel which the oil companies could not hope to obtain from the extant Syrian Government", according to a report in the British Communist Party paper Morning Star, 18 August.

The Strathconon, the first cargo liner of the Peninsular and Orient Line to make the homeward journey fron Japan via the Panama Canal since the closure of the Suez Canal, had arrived in London one day ahead of the original scheduled transit time of 32 days from Japan via Suez.

"If we have not yet realised that we are facing the most perilous situation in our modern history, it is high time that we did". -- Mohammed Heykal, Editor-in-Chief of the Cairo newspaper Al-Ahram, quoted by Cairo Radio, 18 August.

In the Cairo weekly Rose al Youssef of 14 August the editor, Ahmed Hamroush, emphasised that the present battle in Egypt cannot be fought without leadership of the "Party" (meaning the Arab Socialist Union, the State-controlled and only political organisation in the UAR).

Use of the word "Party" is significant, in that President Nasser and other UAR leaders have constantly avoided calling the ASU a party. They have always insisted that it is an "alliance" among the popular forces of the people -- workers, farmers, the military, the intellectuals and national capital.

Hamroush said that a "political vacuum" now exists in the UAR, mainly between the "leadership and the masses" and asked that this vacuum be filled. "It is not logical or possible to establish and protect the Socialist structure against imperialist aggression without a revolutionary party ... The Party is the only way".

/"We say

"We say that the support which the Soviet Union accorded or promised to accord us in a savage battle like the battle we have waged has actually been like a dishonoured cheque". -- Jiddah Radio in Arabic, 21 August.

Chinese propaganda on the Middle East crisis appears to be mainly concerned with using it as a weapon to attack Soviet revisionism, and alleging Moscow's "collusion" with Washington, and also to expound Peking's revolutionary policies. For example, the Red Flag journal made these comments, broadcast by Peking Radio on 23 August:-

"It can be seen from the Middle East events that the military and economic 'aid' provided by the Soviet revisionist clique for the Arab and other African, Asian and Latin American countries is not meant to give genuine support to the anti-imperialist struggles of these countries. This so-called 'aid' only serves the Soviet revisionist clique's neo-colonislist policies and its counter-revolutionary general line of Soviet-United States collaboration for world domination. It uses its 'aid' not only to exploit and plunder other countries; it tries, by means of its 'aid', to have a say in matters concerning these countries, to represent them, interfere in their internal affairs and control them...

"This (Middle East) war proves that it will not do to rely on modern weapons. It will not do to rely on aircraft, tanks or long-range artillery. Chairman Mao says: 'Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor. It is the people, not things, that are decisive".

The Indian Minister of State for Petroleum and Chemicals stated on 13 July that the Russian Trade Representation in India had asked the Indian Oil Corporation to bear an increase of 4.20 dollars (Rs.31.50) per ton in freight charges on kerosene imports from the Soviet Union after the closure of the Suez Canal. On 1 August the Indian Government announced that the ceiling price of kerosene had been raised to 67 paise per litre.

Commenting on this, the Bombay paper "The Current" said on 5 August: "It is interesting to find that the Communists in this country have not uttered a word against kerosene becoming costlier as a result of the increase in Russian freight charges, though whenever the Government has taxed kerosene they have made a big noise about the poor man's daily need becoming costlier".

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION
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vvvvv

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
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(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

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FROM F.O. TO LABAT

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CONFIDENTIAL.

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM KHARTOUM

ADDRESSED TO F O TELNO 495 OF 2 SEPT.

REPTD FOR INFORMATION TO

ARAB POSTS HICOMA ADEN TEL AVIV

DISTRIBUTION AND SAVING TO

WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

1076/67

MY TEL NO 493: SUMMIT CONFERENCE.

THE HEADS OF STATE ARE DISPERSING. NASSER

WAS ONE OF THE FIRST TO LEAVE IN THE EVENING

OF 1/9. AS SEEN FROM HERE THE OUTCOME OF THE

CONFERENCE IS AS SATISFACTORY AS WE CAN

reasonably

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

REASONADLY EXPECT. FROM THE ARAB POINT OF VIEW THEY HAVE ACHIEVED A UNITED FRONT. THE EXCEPTIONS ARE THE/ IRRESPONSIBLE SYRIANS WHO HAVE ISOLATED THEMSELVES BY THEIR BOYCOTT AND POSSIBLY THE ALGERIANS WHO MAY YET USE THEIR COMPARATIVELY LOW-LEVEL REPRESENTATION AS AN EXCUSE FOR DISASSOCIATING THEMSELVES FROM THE CONFERENCE RESOLUTIONS. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW THE DECISION TO REGARD OIL EXPORTS AS A SINEW OF WAR AND NOT A WEAPON OF SPITE REMOVES A SERIOUS THREAT [SHE] OIL PRODUCING STATES ARE HAVING TO PAY A HEAVY PRICE FOR THIS DECISION (SAUDI ARABIA 50 MILLION KUWAIT 55 MILLION LIBYA ["0] MILLION PER YEAR IN THREE MONTHLY TRANCHES PAYABLE IN ADVANCE). THESE SUBVENTIONS WILL HELP EGYPT AND JORDAN TO WARD OFF FOR SOME LITTLE TIME LONGER THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DEFEAT. THIS LEVY MAY ALSO BE EXPECTED TO CAUSE DIFFICULTIES FOR THE OIL COMPANIES. PREDICTABLY THE HEADS OF STATE REAFFIRM THEIR UNSHAKABLE HOSTILITY TO ISRAEL AND THEIR DETERMINATION NOT TO GIVE UP ANY OF THEIR/ LANDS OR TO ENTER INTO ANY SORT OF DIRECT SETTLEMENT. PARADOXICALLY THE EMPHASIS ON ACTION AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL IS AN OPENING POSITION FOR SOME FORM OF MEDIATION PROBABLY IN THE UNITED NATIONS. THE

?? .THE?

corruption.

~~connection~~

declaration

DECLARATION ABOUT BASES WILL PROBABLY EMBARRASS US IN THE GULF.

2. THE FOLLOWING ARE SOME OTHER REFLECTIONS:

(1) NASSER WAS UNQUESTIONABLY THE DOMINATING FIGURE. IF HE HAD DECIDED TO LINE UP WITH THE SYRIANS AND ~~USED~~ USE HIS OWN EXTREMIST PRESSURE ON THE MODERATES WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY HARD TO RESIST. AS IT IS HE HAS IMPARTED RESPECTABILITY TO RESOLUTIONS WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN REGARDED AS A SELL OUT AND WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE ATTACKED AS SUCH BY THE SYRIANS. THE SYRIAN AND IRAQI GOVTS MAY BOTH BE IN FOR AN UNCOMFORTABLE TIME:

THE FORMER BECAUSE THEY APPEAR TO HAVE MISSED OUT IN THE OIL PRODUCERS HANDOUT AND THE LATTER BECAUSE THE BULK OF THEIR RESUMED OIL EXPORTS HAVE TO PASS THROUGH THE SYRIAN PIPE LINE.

(2) DURING THE CONFERENCE THE YEMEN AGREEMENT BETWEEN NASSER AND FEISAL WHICH IS NOT MENTIONED DIRECTLY IN THE communique

COMMUNIQUE CREATED THE GREATEST INTEREST.
IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER IT WILL
STICK IN THE FACE OF FIERCE HOSTILITY FROM
SALIAL AND HIS SUPPORTERS WHICH
MANIFESTED ITSELF BY QUITE SERIOUS
RIOTING BY YEMENIS OUTSIDE THE EGYPTIAN
EMBASSY HERE YESTERDAY.

(3) THE SUDANESE CAN CONGRATULATE
THEMSELVES ON A HIGH STANDARD OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE
CONFERENCE ALTHOUGH THE PRESS
ARRANGEMENTS WERE PRETTY CHAOTIC. APART
FROM THE YEMENI INCIDENT AND A FAIRLY
NOISY DEMONSTRATION BY A CROWD OF
EXTREMISTS (SHOUTING AS ALWAYS DOWN DOWN
USA) THERE WAS NO UNPLEASANTNESS. AZHARI
AND MAHGOUB HAVE GAINED GREAT CREDIT FOR
THEIR PERSONAL EFFORTS IN GETTING THE
CONFERENCE CONVENED AND FOR THEIR HANDLING
OF THE PROCEEDINGS.

(4) ARDENT SUDANESE NATIONALISTS WITH
LITTLE MORE TO LOSE ARE EXPRESSING
DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE SUMMIT DECIDED
NOT TO TAKE REVENGE AGAINST THE US,
BRITAIN AND WEST GERMANY BY EMBARGOING

oil

OIL REMOVING RESERVES AND BREAKING

OFF RELATIONS BUT WITH NASSER COMMITTED

TO THE RESOLUTIONS THERE COMPLAINTS

HAVE NO HEAD OF STEAM BEHIND THEM. ~~NOT~~

FO ASS PRIORITY

ARAB POSTS U/N

HICOMA ADEN 37

TEL AVIV 16

AND SAVING

WASHINGTON 18

UKMIS NEW YORK 12. SOSFA

Done and distributed as directed
+f 1/9 1076

To issue as Press Release —
{ FLASH to MAP (Now)
{ IMMEDIATE to remainder of Groups D (Today)
{ ROUTINE to Groups A + H (Monday)

[illegible]
1/9/67

(Mark envelope to MAP 'FLASH')

D
PRODROME RABAT
OI OP RABATMOM DFDF
PRODROME RABAT
CENTROFORM LDN
VERBATIM SERVICE 359/67 FRIDAY 1ST SEPTEMBER 1967

RETURN OF ARAB REFUGEES TO THE WEST BANK.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE FOREIGN OFFICE LAST NIGHT THURSDAY 31 AUGUST:

HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BY INDICATIONS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS THAT A VERY LARGE NUMBER OF REFUGEES WHO HAVE APPLIED TO RETURN TO THE WEST BANK WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DO SO BEFORE 31 AUGUST.

THEY HAVE ACCORDINGLY, ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, MADE URGENT REPRESENTATIONS TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT REQUESTING AN EXTENSION TO THIS TIME LIMIT.

IT WOULD BE DEPLORABLE IF, FOR THE LACK OF A LITTLE MORE TIME, THIS NEW ELEMENT OF THE WEST BANKERS WHO FLED ACROSS THE JORDAN AS A RESULT OF THE RECENT ARAB-ISRAEL WAR WERE PERMANENTLY ADDED TO THE ALREADY EXISTING INTRACTABLE REFUGEE PROBLEM.

ENDS VERBATIM 359/67

(Also sent by Teler to Le Petit Marocain, Casa

Recd 1300 1 Sept

a.a.

Please enter

Cd'O Tel

QS/ AUS 4.IX

1076

CONFIDENTIAL

(1530)
Saving No. 8
2 September, 1967.

AS 6.IX

FROM TRIPOLI TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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UKDEL OECD 1
Paris 9

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY
-6 SEP 1967

Khalifa Musa, Libyan Minister of Petroleum, told me that he was well satisfied with the way the Baghdad Conference of Ministers of Petroleum and Economy had worked out. He had been very worried at the outset but he had been able to have a preliminary meeting with the Saudis and the Kuwaitis to agree strategy and this had been effective.

2. They had agreed to put forward no proposal but to make the Iraqis and the Algerians table their proposals not as agreed agenda items but as working papers. There had been a procedural tussle over this but they had won and in this tussle they had secured the alignment of all Arab States other than Syria, Iraq, Algeria and Egypt, and this line-up had held. He mentioned the Moroccan Minister, Alawi, as having been particularly strong in support of the British and the Americans and a skilled performer who had out-debated the opposition but also relieved tension when the temperature rose by the injection of some jokes. The Saudis also had done well and in general the moderates had outclassed the extremists because, Khalifa said, the extremist Ministers were all army officers and therefore stupid.

3. Having won the procedural debate they had then compelled the Iraqis to amplify their proposals which consisted of 18 heads including the oil boycott, trade boycott, withdrawal of currency reserves, nationalisation of Western oil companies and similar points, by giving facts and figures. Their plan, said Khalifa, would in fact have made us all communist economies. Their proposal would have entailed an oil boycott of no less than 56 nations and it had been possible to demonstrate its absurdity. The Algerian proposal was shot down, not least by the Moroccans, who pointed out that if an embargo on West Germany was to be applied it must also be imposed on France who had been foremost in helping the Israelis. This struck home to the Algerians who sell most of their oil and gas to France. The Iraqis had supported their proposals by saying that the Russians would make good the loss. Khalifa said that he himself had poured ridicule on this suggestion, drawing attention to the way the Russians had sold oil to the West while the Arabs withheld supplies and were now selling gas in markets which the Libyans needed for their own output. In the end the oil producing countries had told the other Arab States that they would not accept any suggestions regarding the oil industry and that this was a matter that they alone would decide. There had been some talk of the establishment of a Council of Arab Oil Producers but this had run into adamant opposition from the Saudis who refused to be involved in

/any

any committee on which the Algerians were represented.

4. As regards the trade boycott, Khalifa said that this had been opposed even by the Egyptians who had in general played a moderate part. They had admitted quite frankly that they needed Western technology and trade and could not support the proposal. Khalifa felt that the tactics adopted at Baghdad and the alignment which had developed there had a decisive influence on the outcome of the Foreign Ministers meeting and summit conference in Khartoum.

5. He went on to say that the Iraq oil industry was dead and that the Iraqi government was in a state of disorder. Each Minister followed his own line and the permanent officials were deeply unhappy. Both the Secretary-General of the Iraqi Ministry of Petroleum and the Director-General of the National Oil Company had asked him for jobs in Libya. They and other officials had strongly opposed the action of the Government in going ahead with the passage of Law 80 whereby two oilfields known to exist but as yet unexploited, had been nationalised by the Government.

6. Khalifa then commented on the extremely bad relations between Iraq and Syria and said that at the time of the Syrian row over the Iraq Petroleum Company the Iraqi army had been on the point of marching into Syria, and I gather had only been prevented by the attainment of a settlement.

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While relations were bad
they weren't that bad - as
far as I knew there was no
plan for attacking 'each other'.

FOR 006/2

1076

FO LDN GRS 500A 02/1411Z

Ars 4·1x

EN CLAIR
PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO RABAT
TELEGRAM NO. U/N 2 SEPTEMBER 1967

FOLLOWING RECD FROM JHARTOUM.
ADDRESSED TO F O TEL NO 503 DATED 2/9 REPTD FOR INFO TO

PRIORITY TO ARAB POSTS HC ADEN AND TEL AVIV, AND SAVING

TO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK. AT THE FINAL OPEN SESSION

OF THE ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE ON 1ST SEPTEMBER THE CHAIRMAN,

ISMAIL EL AZHARI OF THE SUDAN READ OUT AN OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE.

TEXT OF MAIN POINTS IS IN M I F T . – Not recd.

2. THE SUDANESE PRIME MINISTER MOHD AHMED MAHGOUB TEN

ANNOUNCED THE AGREED RESOLUTIONS OF THE CONFERENCE AS FOLLOWS.

FIRST. THE CONFERENCE AFFIRMED ARAB SOLIDARITY AND

THE UNIFACTION OF ARAB JOINT ACTION IN A PURE ATMOSPHERE OF

COORDINATION AND CONSILIATION. THEIR MAJESTIES AND

EXCELLENCIESKINGS AND HEADS OF STATE AND THEIR REPS

REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE CHARTER OF ARAB SOLIDARITY

ISSUED AT THE THIRD ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN CASABLANCA.

SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX

SECOND. THE CONFERENCE AFFIRMED THE NECESSITY OF
CONCERTED JOINT EFFORTS IN THE ELIMINATION OF ALL TRACES OF
AGGRESSION ON THE BASIS THAT THE RECOVERY OF ALL OFFUPIED ARAB
TERRITORY IS THE JOINT RESPONSIBILITY OF ALL ARAB NATIONS.
THIRD. HE ARAB KINS AND HEADS OF STATE AGREED ON THE
UNIFICATION OF THEIR EFFORTS IN JOINT POLITICAL
AND DIPLOMATIC ACTION AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL TO
THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE AGGRESSIVE ISRAELI FORCES FROM THE OCCUPIED
ARAB TERRITORY AFTER JUNE 5 TH.
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE BASIC ARAB COMMITMENT AND CONVICTION WHICH
ENTAILS NON-RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL, NOR CONCILATION,
NOR NEGOTIATION WITH HER. BUT UPHOLDING THE RIGHTS OF
HE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO THEIR LAND.
FOURTH. THE MINISTERS OF FINANCE, ECONOMY AND PETROL RECOMMENDED THE
POSSIBILITY OF USING THE PETROL AS A WEAPON IN THE STRUGGLE.
BUT THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE AFTER CAREFUL STUDY, SEES THAT THE
PETROL EXPORT COULD BE USED AS A POSSITIVE WEAPON, WHICH WOULD
BE DIRECTED TOWARDS THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE ECONOMY OF THE
ARAB NATIONS THAT DIRECTLY SUFFERED FROM THE AGGRESSION TO
HELP THEM IN FACING THE PRESSURES OF BATTLE.
IT HAS BEEN DECIDED BY THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE THAT PETROLEUM,
BEING AN EFFECTIVE ARAB RESOURCE, WHICH COULD HELP ARAB OBJECTIVES
AND COULD CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS HELPING THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH
WERE DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY THE AGGRESSION AND WHICH HAVE LOST
HEIR ECONOMIC RESOURCES IN FACING UP TO THE ELIMINATION OF
THE TRACES OF AGGRESSION. THE PETROLEUM PRODUCING COUNTRIES
HAVE ALREADY CONTRIBUTED HELP TO THESE COUNTRIES TO ENABLE
THEM TO STAND UP TO ANY
ECONOMIC PRESSURE.
FIFTTH. THE CONFERENCE APPROVED THE SCHEME SUBMITTED BY
KUWAIT TO ESTABLISH AN ARAB DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC AND SOIAL
BANK IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
ARAB FINANCE, ECONOMY AND PETROL MINISTERS CONFERENCE WHICH
MET IN BAGHDAD .
SIXTH. THE CONFERENCE DECIDED THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO TAKE
ALL STEPS TO CONSOLIDATE MILITARY PREPAREDNESS TO FACE
ALL THE CONSEQUENCIES OF THE SITUATION.
SEVENTH. HE CONFERENCE DECIDED TO SPEED UP THE
LIQUIDATION OF THE FOREIGN BASES IN THE ARAB NATIONS.
FOR COMMENT SEE SECOND I F T.
FO PASS RABAT U/N

REDDAWAY/SOSFA GRS....500 SENT AT 1425Z/2 DGP

PRODROME RABAT
PRODROME LONDON

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SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX

1076

X

FOR 002/2
FO LDN GRS 32A
021435Z

EN CLAIR

ROUTINE FOREIGN OFFICE TO RABAT
TELEGRAM NO. 468 2 SEPTEMBER 1967

FOLLOWING RECD FROM ALGIERS.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TEL NO 425 2/9
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO ROUTINE TO ARAB POSTS.
MY TEL NO 413 KHARTOUM SUMMIT (NOT TO ALL) — Not here.
ALGIERS PRESS COMMENT AT DECISIONS OF CONFERENCE TO
DAY LIMITS ITSELF TO NOTICING THE ABSENCE OF ANY MENTION
OF MILITARY ACTION,
WITHDRAWAL OF FUNDS, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS OR BREAKING OF RELATIONS,
AND THAT THOSE WHO WERE HOPING FOR POSITIVE DECISIONS TO EMERGE FROM
THE CONFERENCE ARE DISAPPOINTED .
FCO PASS ROUTINE TO ARAB POSTSL

SENT AT 1440Z/2 SOSFZA GRS....32A DGP

AES 4.11

PRODROME RABAT

PRODROME LONDON

En Clair

PRIORITY KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

AZS 11.IX 1076

Telno 494 2 September 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

F.O. TEL. No. 92 SAVING TO ... Rabat

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 494 of 2 September. Repeated for information Saving to All Arab Posts, H.C. Aden, Tel Aviv, Washington, UKMIS New York.

-1076

My immediately preceding telegram.

Their meetings were characterised by a deep joint sense of the historic responsibility that faces the Arab Nations at this crucial period of their struggle. They have emphasised their determination to stand as one united front in the face of the challenges of destiny and the responsibilities that these challenges impose on the Arab Nations. Their Excellencies, Kings and Heads of Arab States, and their representatives have studied the dimensions of the aggression that faced the Arab Nations on 5 June and they have decided that the elimination of the traces of aggression from the Arab territory is the joint responsibility of all the Arab Nations. And that it entails the mobilisation of the Arab potentialities with a strong belief in the effectiveness of these potentialities in eliminating the traces of aggression and that the set-back that faced the Arab world should be a strong cause for the unification and consolidation of the joint Arab action.

In the light of this evaluation, their Excellencies agreed upon the effective means to achieve elimination of the traces of aggression, and among these is the consideration of the conditions of the countries whose economic resources have suffered directly from the aggression, to enable them to stand upon the face of the economic pressures.

Their Excellencies expressed their profound belief and their strong determination to continue the joint Arab action to preserve the sacred right of the Palestine people to their territory. The Arab leaders appeal to the peoples and Governments of the world to support this just right by taking positive stands in the face of Colonialist and Zionist forces which hinder the Palestinian people from exercising their lawful rights. Their Excellencies reviewed relations between their Nations in all their aspects and agreed upon taking the steps to consolidate and strengthen these mutual relations in accordance with the Charter of Arab solidarity to achieve the aspirations of the Arab Nations for progress and prosperity.

The Arab leaders expressed their great appreciation of the Government of the Sister Sudan for her taking the initial step to invite the leaders to this historical meeting and they deeply commend the enthusiastic reception of the kind and hospitable Sudanese people.

Foreign Office please pass Saving All Arab Posts Unnumbered, H.C. Aden Unnumbered, Tel Aviv 2, Washington 17, UKMIS New York 11.

Mr. Reddaway

Sent 0930Z/ 2 September
Recd 1327Z/ 2 September

[Repeated as requested]

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION
Eastern Dept.

PPPPP

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY
8 SEP 1967

SERVICE TELEX

PRODROME RABAT

FOR 1 FOLDN GRPS 72 030021

1076-

IMMEDIATE FROM JEDDA TO RABAT

TELEGRAM NO 11 3RD SEPTEMBER 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 576 OF 3 SEPT R F I IMMEDIATE TO DUBAI, BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, ABUDHABI, DOHA, TRIPOLI, BENGHAZI, AND ROUTINE TO CAIRO, KHARTOUM, AMMAN, ALGIERS, RABAT AND TUNIS.

DUBAI TELNO 329 TO FOREIGN OFFICE. FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT WAS BROADCAST BY JEDDA RADIO LAST NIGHT. BEGINS. IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE RESOLUTIONS HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT HAVE DECIDED TO RESUME OIL SHIPMENTS TO ALL COUNTRIES WITHOUT EXCEPTION ENDS.

See also 2 tels. below

ALS Southern 4.ox

SENT 030027Z AKC

FIN

C of A Ann.

L.O.A 4/9

F.S.E.

Seen PK 3.9.67

PRODROME RABAT M

re Mr Colin Jackson.
Enter 1 copy

re 1076

L'ENTENTE ANGLO-ARABE

Une nouvelle association, connue sous le nom de "L'Entente Anglo-Arabe" vient d'être créée à Londres. Elle a pour objectif majeur de promouvoir une solution équitable au Moyen-Orient.

M. Colin Jackson, député britannique et co-président de cette association, a récemment effectué un séjour au Maroc; au cours de cette visite, il a rencontré un certain nombre d'importantes personnalités marocaines.

Avant de quitter le Maroc, M. Jackson a dit, au cours d'une déclaration à la presse, que beaucoup de gens en Angleterre, tout en regrettant les résultats malheureux du récent conflit au Moyen-Orient, éprouvent une grande inquiétude devant les malentendus entre le peuple britannique et les peuples du monde arabe. Pour remédier à cet état de choses, et manifester la sympathie et le respect qu'éprouve depuis toujours le peuple britannique à l'égard des Arabes, il a été décidé de former cette nouvelle association afin de renforcer l'entente anglo-arabe.

M. Jackson a déclaré que l'Association est persuadée de la nécessité d'un échange direct de points de vue entre les politiciens, les professeurs d'universités, les hommes d'affaires, les journalistes et les étudiants afin d'aider les peuples britannique et arabes non seulement à comprendre leurs points de vue respectifs mais aussi à les étudier sur une base amicale.

M. Jackson a ensuite ajouté: "Nous croyons en la nécessité d'entente et de sympathie réciproques entre le peuple britannique et les peuples du monde arabe, qui n'a jamais été plus urgente et vitale qu'à présent.

"La Grande Bretagne et les Arabes ont une longue tradition de respect et d'amitié; chacun respecte le mode de vie et les principes observés par l'autre.

"Nous portons la plus vive sympathie aux espoirs, aux réalisations et aux droits des peuples du Moyen-Orient et surtout ceux des Arabes de Palestine dont les affaires ont été administrées par la Grande-Bretagne jusqu'en 1948 et dont il ne faut pas négliger la cause.

"L'opinion publique britannique peut largement contribuer, dans ce monde changeant, à alléger la tension et la détresse au Proche-Orient et ceci en témoignant de la compréhension et en

/insistant

insistant pour une action juste et équitable."

M. Jackson a en outre dit que "c'est pour cela que les fervents de ces objectifs ont été menés à mettre sur pied cette association qui entreprendra également d'éclairer l'opinion publique en Grande-Bretagne sur le point de vue arabe et britannique sur cette question."

M. Jackson a conclu en disant que l'association serait très heureuse d'accueillir les amis et les étudiants du Maroc qui pourront se rendre à Londres et dans les grandes villes provinciales anglaises."

Avant son séjour au Maroc, M. Jackson s'était rendu en Algérie, en Libye et en Tunisie.

1076.

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cy/CAT "A"

[Distribution Heading]

FROM F.O. TO RABAT.

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 471 D M

[Date] 3 SEPT. R M

Repeated to

[Priority] ROUTINE

A.L. Sanctions S.#1X
I.O. 5/9
C of Fm 4/4

RESTRICTED.

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM CAIRO.

ADDRESSED TO F.O. TELEGRAM NO 871 OF 2 SEPTEMBER

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO KHARTOUM AND OTHER ARAB POSTS AND SAVING TO WASHINGTON PARIS MOSCOW AND BELGRADE.

DISTRIBUTION

ARAB SUMMIT CAIRO PRESS CONFINES ITSELF TO FACTUAL REPORT OF FINAL DAY'S PROCEEDING COMMUNIQUE AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS BUT GOUMHOURIA CARRIES FOLLOWING COMMENT: ~~EUOTI~~ "THE CORRESPONDENT OF EL GOUMHOURIA LEARNT THAT IN THE MORNING SESSION OF THE ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE YESTERDAY IMPORTANT DISCUSSIONS TOOK PLACE ABOLT THE ARAB POLITICAL ACTION IN THE UNS TO REMOVE THE EFFECTS OF THE AGGRESSION." ~~UNQUOTE~~. ~~QUOTE~~ "THE PRESIDENTS AND KINGS ALL PUT FORWARD

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

Keir

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

THEIR POINTS OF VIEW IN CONNEXION WITH THE PROPOSALS TO FACE UP TO THE PRESENT CRISIS. THEIR OPINION WAS CLEARLY THAT IT IS NECESSURY FOR A REALISTIC VIEW TO BE TAKEN. THAT IS THAT THE CRISIS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH DUE REGARD TO THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO RETURN TO THEISR LAND. DJRING THE DISCUSSIONS BOTH THE YUGOSLAV POINT OF VIEW ON THE CRISIS WAS REVIEWED.AND ALSO THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE GREAT POWERS.IT CAN BE SAID THAT SEVERAL OF THE ARAB DELEGATIONS INLCLUDING THAT OF THE MAGHREB.TUNISIA AND SAUDI ARABIA SHOWED A COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING OF THE YUGOSLAV VIEWPOINT AND SOME OTHER STATES SUPPORTED THAT THIS VIEWPOINT SHOULD BE THE BASIS FOR THE CONTACTS WHICH SHOULD BE MADE DURING THE NEXT SESSION OF THE UNS.THE OPINION OF SOME OF THE DELE- GATIONS DIFFERED SOMEWHAT INDETAIL FROM THIS ATTITUDE BJT THE MAJ- ORITY GAVE THEIR SUPPORT TO A SERIOUS ATTEMPT BY THE ARABS TO FIND A REASONABLE POLITICAL SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARAB PEOPLE IN ORDER THAT THE ARAB STATES CAN RECOVER THEIR STRENGTH IN VARIOUS FIELDS". ~~UNQUOTE~~.

SOSFA

TELEX ◇ SERVICE

PRODROME RABAT

FOR 2/4 FOLDN GRS 136 0420317

1076

ROUTINE TEL AVIV P TO RABAT

TELNO. 3 4 SEPTEMBER 1967

ADDSD FO TELNO 283 OF 4 SEPT RFI AMMAN, BENGHAZI, BAHRAIN, JEDDA, KHARTOUM, KUWAIT, TRIPOLI, RABAT, RUNIS, CAIRO, ALGIERS, BEIRUT, BELGRADE, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEWYORK, H C ADEN, PARIS AND UKDEL NATO PARIS TELNO 3.

No recd.

YOUR TELNO 316 TO BELGRADE. PRESIDENT TITO'S PROPOSALS.

AT THE CABINET MEETING ON SUNDAY, 3 SEPTEMBER THE ISRAEL FOREIGN MINISTER IS REPORTED TO HAVE REJECTED PRESIDENT TITO'S PROPOSALS FOR SOLVING THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM.

MR EBAN IS SAID TO HAVE CHARACTERISED PRESIDENT TITO'S EFFORTS AS BEING AIMED ' NOT TO SAVE THE PEACE BUT TO SAVE THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS FROM MAKING PEACE' WITH ISRAEL. PRESIDENT TITO'S INITIATIVES WERE BEING PURSUED OVER ISRAEL'S HEAD AND ANY PEACE PLAN WHICH WAS NOT CONDITIONAL ON THE CONSENT OF BOTH SIDES VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLES OF SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE OF STATES ' WHICH YUGOSLAVIA ONCE CHAMPIONED'.

2. ISRAEL HAD RECEIVED NO DIRECT INFORMATION ABOUT THE TITO PLAN BUT KNEW OF IT FROM VARIOUS SOURCES SINCE IT HAD BEEN PUBLISHED IN BELGRADE, CAIRO, NEW DELHI AND ELSEWHERE. ISRAEL'S OUTRIGHT OPPOSITION TO THIS PLAN WOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF ALL GOVERNMENTS WITH WHICH ISRAEL HAD DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

See also 2 l.p.t's from Tel Aviv below
A.L. Southern 5.IX

HADOW

C d:9/9/67.
I.O. 5/9

SENT AT 0420367 ND

PRODROME RABAT

PRODROME RABAT
PRODROME LONDON
PRODROME LONDON
FOR 004 FO LDN GRP 305A

1076

FOREIGN OFFICE TO RABAT

TELAVIV 008 4 SEPT

ALS 5.1x

ADDSD FO TELNO [illegible] OF 4 SEPT RFI AMMAN, BENGHAZI, BAHRAIN, JEDDA, KHARTOUM, KUWAIT, TRIPOLI, RABAT, TUNIS, CAIRO, ALGIERS, BEIRUT, HC ADEN, WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

-1076/67

KHARTOUM TELNO 5[illegible]3 OF 2 SEPT.

ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE.

AFTER THE CABINET MEETING ON SUNDAY, 3 SEPT, PRIME MINISTER LEVI ESHKOL ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT COMMENTING THE ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE. 'AFTER THE WAR AND THE BEGINNING OF THE CEASE-FIRE, THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED ITS WISH TO COME TO PEACEFUL TERMS WITH THE ARAB STATES AND ITS READINESS TO OPEN NEGOTIATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS WITHOUT DELAY.
THIS ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ISRAEL GOVT HAD NO RESPONSE FROM THE ARAB RULERS. NOW THAT THE ARAB HEADS OF STATE HAVE CONVENED

PRODROME LONDON

TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE

AT KHARTOUM, THEY HAVE ANNOUNCED THAT THEY ARE RESOLVED NOT TO COME TO PEACEFUL TERMS WITH ISRAEL. THEY HAVE ALSO DECIDED NOT TO RECOGNISE THE FACT OF OUR EXISTENCE OR TO OPEN NEGOTIATIONS WITH US. THIS IRRESPONSIBLE DECISION IGNORES THE TRUE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND RUNS COUNTER TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE U.N. CHARTER.'

'THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL POINTS TO THIS GRAVE FACT WHICH DELAYS THE PROSPECT OF PEACE IN THE AREA AND NOTES THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS INVOLVED'.

' THIS STAND OF THE ARAB HEADS OF STATE REINFORCES THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT'S DECISION NOT TO PERMIT THE RETURN OF SUCH CONDITIONS THAT ENABLE OUR ENEMIES TO UNDERMINE OUR security and (ccn requested) 5/5

~~TO RIOT AGAINST OUR~~

'ISRAEL WILL NOT REFRAIN FROM EFFORTS TO COME TO PEACEFUL TERMS WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS. WE WILL BE STRICT REGARDING TTE EXECUTION OF PROCEDURES A H SRIN

AUKBWN THE CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTIONS'.

IN THE FACE OF THE AGRESSIVE INTENTIONS OF THE ARAB RULERS WHO REFUSE TO NEGOTIATE PEAC WITH US, WE WILL HOLD FIRM TO OUR POSITIONS WHICH ARE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE SECURITY AND UO BR

RL EVEL PLYK
OPMENT OF ISRAEL'

V
HADOW
SENT AT 04235[illegible]Z
B B

PRODROME RABAT
PRODROME LONDON

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PRODROME RABAT

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PRODROME RABAT

T PRODROME LONDON

1076

FOR 003 FO LDN GRPS 142Z

PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE RABAT
TELEGRAM 007 4 SEPT

ADDED TO FO TEL NO 007 OF P R SEPT RFI UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL GENEVA, AMMAN, JERUSALEM, TRIPOLI, BENGHAZI, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, KHARTOUM, ~~PRODROME RABAT~~ CAIRO, ALGIERS, WASHINGTON. BEIRUT.

1076/67

REFUGEES.

MY TEL NO 078. ON SUNDAY , 3 SEPTEMBER, ISRAEL GOVT OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED THAT IT HAS AGREED TO THE RETURN OF WEST BANK REFUGEES WHO HAD RECEIVED BUT HAD NOT USED THEIR PERMITS TO RETURN BY 31 AUGUST.

IT IS ESTIMATED THAT SOME 14,000 REFUGEES HAVE ALREADY RETURNED AND THAT AN ADDITIONAL 6,000 WILL BE ELIGIBLE TO DO SO UNDER THE NEW ARRANGEMENTS.

2. THE PRACTICAL DETAILS OF THE EXTENSION OPERATION, INCLUDING STARTING AND CLOSING DATES OF RESUMED CROSSINGS, ARE TO BE WORKED OUT BY THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE AND THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR.

3. IT IS REPORTED IN THE PRESS THAT THIS DECISION WAS TAKEN AT THE CABINET MEETING HELD ON SUNDAY, 26 AUGUST.

HADOW

AZS 5.IX

BCOR TELN IS TELAVIV 007

SENT AT 042353Z
BB

PRODROME RABAT

CONFIDENTIAL

1076

British Embassy,
TUNIS
4 September, 1967

(10610)

The Tunisian contributions to the Khartoum summit seem to have been offered principally at long range, in the form of President Bourguiba's speech of 25 August, and subsequent press editorials. Their effect must have been somewhat muted by the suppression in Khartoum of the President's speech (Khartoum telegram No. 484 to you).

2. It seems clear that Bourguiba took advantage of his customary annual address to the Executive of the Students' Federation to make a major plea for a more realistic policy vis-à-vis Israel. I enclose for the record a copy of the French text of his remarks on that occasion, from which you will see that his urging of a reappraisal of Arab policies came perilously close to advocating a negotiated peace with Israel. Perhaps alarmed or uncomfortable by reports of reactions to the speech, the Tunisian Government later put out a "mise au point", denying that Bourguiba had advocated a direct approach to Israel and maintaining that this had been merely a plea for a "new look" at Arab policies.

3. Bourguiba's own absence from the Khartoum summit was based on medical advice; this is a plausible justification since his doctors are still in the background, after his heart attack last March. In particular he had earlier put off going to the U.S. in September for the same reason. But his absence does represent something of a bonus for the Tunisians in that it was probably convenient for them to deal with the Arab states at one remove, i.e. with Bahi Ladghem deputising for the President and Mongi Slim for Habib Bourguiba Jr. In this way the President could maintain a relative freedom of manoeuvre, and dissassociate the Bourguiba image from any evident failure of the Khartoum meetings. Incidentally, from the internal political viewpoint it was interesting to note that Bahi Ladghem was sent to Khartoum as President Bourguiba's "closest collaborator". This suggests that he may be being visibly groomed for the succession in case of need.

4. The Tunisian delegation is only just back from Khartoum and Beirut, so that we have had no chance as yet to gather first-hand comments. Such expressions of

/opinion

P. L. V. Mallet, Esq.,
North and East African Department,
Foreign Office

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY
12 SEP 1967

opinion as have appeared are an official intimation that Tunisia would abide by her obligations following the summit meetings, and press editorials expressing unequivocal joy at the Yemen settlement, and the somewhat restrained tribute to the achievements at Khartoum. "L'Action", the Destour Socialist Party newspaper, opined that it would have been unrealistic to hope for rapid, bold and clear decisions from the meetings, capable of revitalising the Arab world. Nevertheless it was a positive achievement, notably in the improvement it brought in the inter-Arab situation. The past destructive disputes had been resolved and the colossal £135 million aid voted for Egypt and Jordan constituted the most striking evidence of the Arabs' capacity to re-organise themselves. The paper also approved the decision not to disrupt the Arab economic situation, and prevoke new clashes with the great powers. The significance of Khartoum was that it provided a new point of departure for the Arabs. After the recent disaster, it was unthinkable that the Arabs should continue to quarrel among themselves.

5. I am sending copies of this letter, without enclosure, to the Chancerios at Khartoum, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jedda, Kuwait, Bahrain, Tel Aviv, Algiers, Rabat, Tripoli, Benghazi, Washington and Paris.

(C. T. Brant)

CONFIDENTIAL

Chancery,
Rabat

With the compliments of

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
EMBASSY

(10610)

AMS 13.IX

BRITISH EMBASSY
TUNIS

4 September, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL **TELEGRAM** (1530) 1076

Cypher

Code

Clear

From:— TRIPOLI

To:—

FO 872
BENGHAZI 318
OBFNE U/N
UKDEL OECD 15
WASHINGTON (S) 13
ALGIERS (S) 9
JEDDA (S) 7
AMMAN (S) 6
RABAT 11 (S)
TUNIS (S) 14
KUWAIT (S) 9
BEIRUT (S) 7
DUBAI (S) 2
KHARTOUM (S) 5
BAHRAIN (S) 7
CAIRO (S) 5
DOHA (S) 4
ABU DHABI (S) 4

Despatched 4.9.67

Received

No. 872 of

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to FO tel.No. 872 of 4 September, 1967 repeated for information to Benghazi, OBFNE, UKDEL OECD and saving to Washington, Algiers, Jedda, Amman, Rabat, Tunis, Kuwait, Beirut, Dubai, Khartoum, Bahrain, Cairo, Doha, Abu Dhabi.

ARAB SUMMIT RESOLUTIONS.

Libyan Government has every reason to be satisfied with outcome of conference xxxx as promised by Minister of Petroleum and the King and has lost no time in ordering the resumption of direct oil exports to all purchasers; a decision to this effect was taken on 3 September by the Council of Ministers.

2. Resolutions of Conference have been generally welcomed by all shades of Tripoli press as re-establishing Arab "solidarity" But there is no particular enthusiasm for decision to resume oil exports, which appears to have come as something of a surprise at

(28749) Wt.37855-1039 12m 2/51 G.S.St.

surprise at popular level. Papers make best of the argument that to maximise oil exports enables the producer countries to assist the main Arab protagonists in the Israeli war to carry on the good fight. As for the tripartite fund for the UAR and Jordan, it is announced that Libya's share of £30 m. per annum will be paid in quarterly instalments. We have heard some grumbling at popular level about this largesse and I dare say the first flush of generosity will wear off fairly soon. But given her geographical position, ~~kkkyx~~ and recent large Occidental company's finds, Libya now stands to exceed considerably estimates of oil production for the current financial year, and in the final analysis she may be able to raise the contribution she has pledged without any adverse effect on development projects at home.

SARELL

CONFIDENTIAL

CHANCERY,
RABAT.

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS

OF THE

BRITISH EMBASSY IN LIBYA.

A.L. Southorn 6.IX

C a'[illegible].
L.O.
F.S.(E) 20/9

4 September, 1967.

TRIPOLI,
LIBYA.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY
-6 SEP 1967

1076

CONFIDENTIAL

(10710/67)

Canadian Embassy,
BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION,
Cairo.

A.L. Sowden 13.IX

C.F.A.

5 September, 1967.

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY
12 SEP 1967

Arab Summit

The following are first thoughts on the Summit's pronouncements and comments on local reactions.

2. It seems to us that Nasser, after almost three months of surveying the wreckage and counting his remaining assets has, without abandoning his basic Arab nationalist position, achieved a quite remarkable stabilization of his position in the Arab world. After the miserable failures on the battlefield and in the United Nations, here he is still an acclaimed leader of the Arabs, standing on a position which does begin to make some sort of sense.

3. We find suddenly that the Arabs have left the untenable ground that the Americans and British were responsible for the defeat and must be opposed head-on; that the way to recovery lies through bringing economic pressure on the outside world beginning with Israel (on whom it has no effect), the U.S.A. (who can afford to ignore it) and the U.K. and West Germany (where it is irrelevant because they have no decisive say in the issue). Instead, it has been recognised that the real danger is that the Arab countries will be forced, by economic pressures on themselves (particularly Egypt, through the Canal) to give in ignominiously or to collapse into economic and political chaos (see paragraph 4 of the Joint Declaration). So we see the argument on oil as a weapon turned on its head; and the aggression no longer defined as involving anyone but Israel and Zionism (we take Ahram's version of paragraph 5 of the Joint Declaration - "... more positive attitudes towards the forces of Zionist imperialism").

4. Egypt, and Nasser, have now won time. Nasser's own political position in the Arab world is re-established; his fears of economic, and therefore perhaps political, collapse in Egypt itself, have been relieved for some time to come; and he has room for political manoeuvre.

5. There is not much indication of how great this scope is. There is to be no peace, recognition or negotiation with Israel, and no abandoning of the "right of the Palestinian people to their homeland". It is however interesting that Goumhouriya (my telegram No. 871) should have reported that Tito's ideas for a compromise found at any rate a wide measure of tentative support. It is also

/interesting

D. J. Speares, Esq.,
N.E.A.D.,
Foreign Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

interesting that pride of place in the resolutions was taken by Arab unity, the resurrection of the authority of the Arab Summit Conferences (the press reports independently that a new Summit will be held in due course) and, by implication, acceptance of non-intervention by the Arab countries in one another's internal affairs. The unity is imperfect in that the Algerians and Syrians appear to have sulked in their tents but, on the other hand, Bourguiba did not embarrass the Conference by his presence, so that the Summit could represent itself as a consensus of the Arab heartland, not an imposition of the will of any of the Arab extremes. Military action is not omitted from mention but there is no suggestion that for some time to come it will be more than defensive action. The process of elimination of foreign bases is to be speeded up but no harsh time limits are set. There is no reference to a boycott, or the withdrawal of funds from "imperialist countries"; by implication, countries will be left free to trade with the West where this is to their advantage, and there is no more about Arab economic self-sufficiency. Egypt is to be subsidized with free currency and first soundings suggest that there is no longer (if there ever was) any firm intention here to ban British imports. Nor is there preceptive adoption of the nationalisation of foreign firms.

6. Finally, there is no reference to the communist brethren, any more than there is to Western imperialism; and if the Egyptians nevertheless are obliged to continue their present search for economic support from the Eastern bloc they will at least be able to afford to be a little more choosy.

7. The immediate press reaction here was slight but the wordings of the headlines suggested that the line is "realism" and "constructive beginnings".

8. Clearly, a lot can go wrong. In particular it will need real cooperation between Feisal and Nasser if the Yemen question is to be solved over the heads of the Yemenis and possibly of the Egyptian army there. But for all Boumedienne or the Syrian Junta may be able to do, it seems highly likely that the Summit will have taken the heat out of the situation in the Arab world. Moreover I suspect that most of the outside world will welcome the agreement to a greater or lesser degree and that the heat will now begin to be turned on Israel. This is no doubt the idea - [illegible], from our point of view, not a bad one.

9. I am copying this letter to the Chanceries at Washington, Paris, Moscow, New York, Aden (J.I.C.), Algiers, Amman, Bahrain (Residency), Beirut, Benghazi, Jedda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tripoli and Tunis.

(R. M. Tesh)

1076

F.O. TEL. No. 93 ..... SAVING TO Robat

En Clair

PRIORITY KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Tel. No. 506 5 September, 1967

AJS 13.17

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 506 of 5 September. Repeated for information Saving to Washington, UKMIS New York, Arab Posts, Tel Aviv.

See my immediately preceding telegram.

Following are extracts from a special review of the Khartoum Arab Summit Conference in the Sudan News Agency of 2 September by the Chief Editor, Abdel Karim el Mahdi.

2. Resumption of petroleum exports.

The Conference resolved to resume the export of petrol to the purchasing countries. The situation of Britain was also reviewed on the basis of what she had shown, since the aggression, of a feeling of responsibility towards the Arab problem.

3. Following the agreement among all parties in the Conference, President Nasser presented the proposal for resuming the export of petrol as a means of promoting relations with countries affected by Arab petrol such as Britain and Western Germany, and of opening the door for new relations to be based on complete understanding.

4. Withdrawal of foreign reserves.

It was left for the individual Arab countries to withdraw or leave their reserves in the countries which are acquitted of supporting the aggression ... the discussion touched on Britain and its relations with Arabs and opened the way for new relations with her on a sound basis, thus giving her the opportunity to change her views regarding the Middle East and the Arab countries.

Foreign Office pass Saving all Arab Posts unnumbered, Tel Aviv 3, Washington 19, UKMIS New York 13.

Mr. Reddaway

Sent 1030Z/5 September
Recd. 1234Z/5 September

[Repeated as requested]

FO/CO/WH. DISTRIBUTION

Eastern Dept.

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 12 SEP 1967

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Cypher/Cat A

CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 884 6 September, 1967

AJS 13.IX

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 884 of 6 September
Repeated for information Saving to:- Washington, U.K.Mis New York, Paris, Moscow, Algiers, Amman, Bahrain, Beirut, Benghazi, Jedda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Rabat, Tripoli, Tunis, Tel Aviv, H.C. Aden, LIC Aden and JIC Cyprus.

Reference my telegram 881 (not repeat not to all): U.A.R. Communist bloc relations. In the same conversation Indian Ambassador confirmed that the Chinese had angrily terminated their shipments of what offered as aid after the war. On Eastern European Communist aid he thought it was quite possible that this would be affected by the Khartoum decision: "in fact, this was quite on the cards".

Foreign Office please pass Saving to Washington 36, U.K.Mis New York 26, Paris 37, Moscow 32, Algiers 8, Amman 8, Bahrain 8, Beirut 13, Benghazi 6, Jedda 12, Khartoum 3, Kuwait 6, Rabat 6, Tripoli 7, Tunis 5, Tel Aviv 11, H.C. Aden Personal 2, LIC Aden unnumbered and JIC Cyprus unnumbered.

Mr. Tesh Sent 0915Z 6 September, 1967

Recd 1355Z 6 September, 1967

[Repeated as requested]

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 12 SEP 1967

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PRODROME RABAT
FOR FO LDN GRS 100 071200Z

1076

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO RABAT
TEL NO 7/SEPT/1967

FOLLOWING RECD FROM BEIRUT

ADDED FOREIGN OFFICE TEL NO 1026 OF 7/9/67
RFI AMMAN BAHRAIN CAIRO JEDDA KHARTOUM KUWAIT RABAT TUNIS
TRIPOLI UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.
ANGLO-LEBANESE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.
ACCORDING TO THIS MORNING'S LEBANESE NEWSPAPERS THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAVE DECIDED TO NORMALISE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES, AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER IS REPORTED AS SAYING THAT HE EXPECTED THE LEBANESE AMBASSADOR TO RETURN TO LONDON WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

2. NO COMMUNICATION ON THIS SUBJECT HAS BEEN MADE TO ME, BUT I AM SEEING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE M.F.A. LATER THIS MORNING AND WILL TELEGRAPH FURTHER IN THE LIGHT OF OUR CONVERSATION.

SOSFA.

~~FO PAS UKMIS NEW YORK AS MY TEL 3~~.

~~TABLE~~

O.S. informed
13.45 local time
7/9/67

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A.L. Southern 7.IX

PSE DELETE ALL AFTER CONVERSATION AND INSERT SOSFA
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C d'O Tel. 7/9

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PRODROME RABAT

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FOR [illegible] GRS 100A 071632Z

1076

I M M E D I A T E BEIRUT TO RABAT =

TELNO 10 7TH SEPTEMBER, 1967.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1027 OF 7 SEPTEMBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN, BAHRAIN, CAIRO, JEDDA, KHARTOUM,
KUWAIT, RABAT, TUNIS, TRIPOLI, UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

ANGLO-LEBANESE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

THE LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER TODAY INFORMED ME OF
HIS GOVERNMENTS DECISION TO PROPOSE THE RETURN TO LONDON
OF THE LEBANESE AMBASSADOR AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT
THE NEW BRITISH AMBASSADOR WOULD BE ABLE TO COME TO BEIRUT
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
2. I PROMISED TO TRANSMIT THIS PROPOSAL TO MY GOVERNMENT
AT ONCE AND TO SEEK YOUR VIEWS.
3. SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM (NOT TO ALL).

~~SAVE~~ GRS 100 SENT [illegible]

SOSFA.

A.L. Southorn
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T.G.T.L. No. U/N SAVING TO Rabat

1076

By Bag

SAVING TELEGRAM

FOREIGN OFFICE/COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO ABIDJAN AND CERTAIN OTHER MISSIONS

Abno 26 Saving 8 September, 1967 (J.I.P.G.D.)

A.L. Sowton 15.IX

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Abidjan telegram No.26 Saving of 8 September, And Saving Unnumbered to other Foreign Office and Commonwealth Posts.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 14 SEP 1967

MIDDLE EAST TALKING POINTS

7 September, 1967.

"It is a grave mistake to look upon everything the Soviet Union says as something handed down from on high and beyond dispute, and on anything the others say as heresay. Any attempt of this kind will damage not only ourselves but the Soviet Union as well, because it would turn our friendship into servility - something which neither we nor any friend would accept". - From an article by Muhammed Hasanayn Heykal, Editor-in-Chief of Al-Ahram, quoted by Cairo Radio, 25 August.

According to Borek Homola, writing on the Middle East in the Prague newspaper Rude Pravo on 8 August, the view that the Arab-Israeli war continues, and has not been completely lost because there will be a "second stage", is an antidote to defeatism and a factor maintaining unity. He paid particular attention to the Syrian position and quoted Syrian moderates as pointing out that this belief cannot be maintained for ever. Syrian unity should be based on more lasting elements than threat from the outside and war.

"When the question of realism arises it is worth mentioning that ever more voices come out for the recognition of the State of Israel". - From a Khartoum dispatch in the Polish newspaper Trybuna Ludu, 31 August.

In an interview with the Jordanian News Agency on 5 September, King Hussein was asked about the dispatch of fedayeen to the territory currently occupied by Israel to strengthen passive resistance there. He said: "Concerning former fedayeen operations, it has now become clear that their positive results were very limited. They were also one of the most important weapons used by the enemy to impose the battle on us at a time chosen and dictated by him alone. Fedayeen operations had been carried out before the aggression in contravention of the orders of the Unified Arab Command and of the Arab plan to build up Arab strength".

"There is no dictionary which defines Socialism. I have found that for some Socialism consists of impoverishing the rich. My kind of Socialism consists of enriching the poor". - King Hassan of Morocco, in a speech during a tour of Agadir Province, 12 August.

La guerre israélo-arabe a coûté plus de 1 milliard de dollars aux pays arabes, en plus des dépenses militaires, estime un rapport officiel publié par l'agence Tass. Dans ce total, l'Égypte figure à elle seule pour 700 millions de dollars.

Le Monde, 3-4 September, quoting a despatch from Belgrade.

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Khartoum Despatch No. 19 of 8 September, 1967

SUMMARY

The Arab Summit Conference at Khartoum

29 August to 1 September 1967

All Arab states except Syria were represented. King Hassan of Morocco, King Idris of Libya and President Boumeddienne sent representatives (paragraphs 1 and 2).

Two meetings of Foreign Ministers at Khartoum and the meeting of Economic Ministers at Baghdad paved the way but all contentious issues were left for the leaders to decide; in all likelihood it was President Nasser's personal decision that the Conference should take place despite the fact that the preparatory meetings had shown that the moderates could not be bullied into applying economic sanctions against the West (paragraphs 3 and 4).

Nasser's decision to do a deal with the moderates does not imply any willingness to negotiate directly with Israel, but he made it clear that an early resumption of the war was out of the question (paragraphs 5 and 6).

Proceedings of the Conference are probably accurately reflected in the resolutions. The reference to action at international level denotes moves to bring pressure to bear on Israel at the U.N. (paragraph 7).

The agreement reached by Faisal and Nasser on the Yemen is regarded as genuine (paragraph 8).

The absence of the Syrians at first caused disappointment but the performance of Makhous convinced the Sudanese that they were no great loss (paragraph 9).

Nasser was the dominant figure inside and outside the Conference. For the Sudanese at least he remains, despite his humiliating military defeat, the only credible leader of the Arab cause. Faisal established himself as the leader of the moderates and Mahgoub earned credit for his part in convening the Conference (paragraphs 10 and 11).

The Sudanese handled the arrangements well; the only unpleasantness was caused by the Yemenis demonstrating against the Faisal/Nasser agreement. They gave all

/delegations

delegations a warm welcome but Nasser was their hero (paragraph 12).

The outcome of the Conference was satisfactory. A damaging oil boycott has been averted and it is a step forward that the Arabs are ready to seek a political solution short of a direct settlement with the Israelis. The possibility of co-existence in the Middle East has been opened (paragraph 13).

The present Sudan Government has committed itself too deeply to change course suddenly but there are signs of a shift in the political climate (paragraph 14).

The Arabs will observe closely our actions at the U.N. If we can be seen to stick to the doctrine of no territorial advantage through military conquest a rapid turn for the better in our relations with them is probable (paragraph 15).

RESTRICTED

British Interests Section
of the Italian Embassy,
Khartoum.
8 September, 1967.

No. 19
(10722)

Sir,

The Arab Summit Conference at Khartoum
29 August to 1 September, 1967

I have the honour to report on the Conference of Arab Heads of State, which took place in Khartoum from the 29th of August to the 1st of September, 1967, for the purpose of drawing up concerted plans to reverse the defeats suffered by the Arab countries in the war with Israel, or in the phrase which is used so often here 'to remove the vestiges of Israeli aggression'.

2. I have already reported by telegram the main features of the Conference and, for ease of reference, --- I reproduce as an annex to this despatch the joint communiqué and the agreed resolutions announced at the end of the Conference; the communiqué contains a list of delegates. King Hassan of Morocco, President Bourguiba of Tunis, King Idris of Libya sent representatives; President Boumeddienne threatoned

/that

The Right Honourable
George Brown, M.P.,
etc., etc., etc.,
London, S.W.1.

RESTRICTED

that Algeria would not take part, but at the last moment sent his Foreign Secretary, Boutiflika. Syria was the only absentee, though Dr. Makhous, the Syrian Foreign Secretary, took part in the preparatory meeting of Foreign Ministers and did not actually leave Khartoum until the Conference was well under way.

3. I have already described in my Despatch No. 18 of the 11th of August how the idea of an Arab Summit Conference was conceived by the Sudanese in the immediate wake of the war and how, after much hesitation and uncertainty, the way for the Conference was paved by a meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers in Khartoum during the first week of August. In further efforts to harmonise conflicting political and economic interests, a meeting of economic and oil Ministers was held in Baghdad on the 16th of August, and a second meeting of Foreign Ministers took place in Khartoum immediately before the Summit itself. The economic meeting was inconclusive· the inconsistency between the embargo on oil shipments to the West and the need to help the victim countries could not be evaded. The curtain raiser in Khartoum was a hasty formality at which the Foreign Ministers drew up an agenda designed to exclude nothing and to commit nobody, and dexterously passed out all the contentious issues to their masters with scarcely a jink. There were also two

/notable

notable individual efforts during the preliminary phase: King Hussein made a lightning tour of the capitals of the more moderate states: it is likely that he impressed upon his hosts the desperate plight of Jordan, and it is rumoured from a number of sources that he lobbied support for a rather curious plan of setting up a separate de-militarised Palestine State comprising the West Bank of the Jordan and the Gaza Strip; there is even a rumour that he had the secret support of Nasser for proposing such a scheme. The second individual effort was that of Mahgoub, the Sudanese Prime Minister, who visited Saudi Arabia and Egypt in search of a settlement of the dispute between Egypt and Saudi Arabia over the Yemen.

4. These preliminaries obviously had as their purpose the establishment of sufficient common ground to enable the Arab leaders to meet at all. Nasser was the key. At the earlier meetings in Khartoum and particularly at Baghdad it emerged that the moderates could not be bullied into prolonging the oil embargo, limited or unlimited; into removing their currency reserves from western countries; or into a complete break with Britain, the United States and West Germany.

5. Where would Nasser put his weight? This was the question. From the moment that he rose to make his long key speech at the first closed session of the Conference

/it

it could not be concealed that he had accepted the realities of the situation; whatever he might feel about Israel or about the revolution in the Yemen (and there is no reason to suppose that he has changed his views about either) his economic and military plight compelled him to seek a peaceful solution and try to rebuild his country's shattered strength. The enfeebled lion would perforce lie down with the lambs.

6. However, as seen from here Nasser's willingness to do a deal with the moderates does not imply willingness on his part to enter into any form of direct negotiations with Israel. The bitter hatred of Israel and all it stands for is unimpaired. On the other hand, an early resumption of the war is unthinkable. I have been told a story that at the beginning of the Conference Nasser remarked that the first item on the agenda appeared to call for a resumption of the war, and he was greeted with silence when he went on to say that Egypt was in no position to fight and he would like to know what other country was ready to take up arms. From there on the main issue confronting the Conference was whether the struggle could be carried on most effectively by imposing economic sanctions on the west, or by garnering and pooling the resources of the Arab world. The second course won the day, and there is now talk of seeking the cooperation of the west, as well as of the east, in driving the Israelis

/back

back behind their borders. The Sudanese, who suffer more than most Arab countries from the closure of the Canal, acquiesce in its continued closure at the expense of the oil rich states because they share Nasser's hope that it will move the rest of the world to force the Israelis to withdraw.

7. The Conference itself, apart from a formal opening speech by President Azhari and the announcement of the communiqué at the end, was held behind closed doors. Most of the discussions that took place are probably reflected in the resolutions. Nasser's alignment with the moderates in return for a hefty subvention curtailed the debate. There could only be one public verdict on the Canal while the Israelis remain entrenched on the east bank. The resolution calling for continued action at international level is clear evidence that diplomatic tactics were discussed. The most likely conclusion is that Nasser was invited to continue his dialogue with the Russians and Tito, and that it was agreed in general terms that the Security Council and the General Assembly would be the arena for the next Arab diplomatic offensive. It was probably agreed that the resumption of oil supplies together with the relatively non-aggressive tone of the communiqué opened the door to better relations with the west with the hope that they might be persuaded to exert pressure on Israel. De Gaulle, for all his efforts,

/does

does not appear to have had a mention.

8. With no direct access to the proceedings of the Conference, the main interest in Khartoum centred on the Yemeni settlement, and on the antics of the odd men out - Makhous, Shukairy and Sallal. Nasser and Faisal arrived in Khartoum simultaneously and met to discuss the Yemen almost as soon as they reached their hotel. Later there was a three hour meeting in Mahgoub's private house, conveniently overlooked by the Information Officer's house from which the comings and going could be observed. It is universally believed in Khartoum that genuine and complete agreement was reached. The agreement was denounced immediately by Sallal and there were violent anti-Nasser demonstrations by the Yemenis in Khartoum the following day; The Sudanese wonder how the agreement can be made to work without Yemeni cooperation, but have faith in Mahgoub's powers of persuasion.

9. For the rest, there was little surprise or concern that King Hassan, King Idris and President Bourguiba decided to send representatives. But, the Sudan having aligned itself with the revolutionary camp, there was considerable annoyance and disappointment that the Syrians and, as it first seemed, the Algerians, would take no part. The performance of the Syrians at and after the Foreign Ministers' meeting convinced most Sudanese that they were no great loss. Mahgoub is supposed to have

/compared

compared Makhous, the Syrian Foreign Minister, with the president of a students' union. Shukairi, the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, who strongly criticised the agreed resolutions; walked out before the end; no-one seemed to mind; the Sudanese explained that Shukairy seldom attends the last session of any conference. The Arab League was strongly criticised by Sudanese leaders for its failure to play a positive role and its non-representation at the Conference; there is a general view here that the League needs a drastic overhaul.

10. The Economist of the 2nd of September predicted that the Summit Conference 'will prove whether President Nasser can still navigate the Arabs or whether he can only drift on an ungovernable tide'. The verdict must be that he was unquestionably the captain of the Arab ship. We were debarred by our hole-in-the-corner status from taking part in any of the official functions, but he was plainly the dominant figure. He was greeted with tremendous enthusiasm, and chanting crowds followed him wherever he went. He dominated capital and Conference alike. His move towards the moderates gave meaning to the Conference. With Nasser a moderate, however temporarily, it does not seem to matter greatly that the Algerians are lukewarm and the Syrians hostile. However serious his domestic and economic problems, this was his Conference.

/11.

11. The other two stars were Faisal and Mahgoub. The Sudanese gave Faisal a polite rather than enthusiastic reception, but his dignity and determination stamped him as the unmistakable leader of the moderates. Mahgoub probably had little influence on the main decisions of the Conference, but he earned great credit by his success in convening the Conference and handling the proceedings. Hussein and Arif did not come into the limelight: the other Arab leaders were, in the main, content to leave the running to Faisal and Nasser.

12. In their customary 'it will be all right on the night' fashion the Sudanese did very well as hosts. Large cheerful crowds thronged the streets, but apart from a demonstration by the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation which, through force of habit, broke through the police cordon and yelled 'Down, down U.S.A.' outside the American Embassy building, and a more unpleasant affair outside the Egyptian Embassy staged by Yemenis protesting against the Nasser/Faisal agreement, there was no unpleasantness. There was no noticeable anti-Western feeling. Exceptionally heavy rains in August have almost cut off Khartoum from supplies of petrol, aviation fuel and food, but by raiding the supplies of the rest of the population, the arrangements for the Conference were not affected by these shortages. The Sudanese gave a warm welcome to all the Heads of State. Distinguished visiting journalists from Britain were treated

/as

as old friends, and the prominence given to the Conference, and the tributes paid to Mahgoub in leading British newspapers, will pour oil on the troubled waters of Anglo-Sudanese relations. Since the outbreak of the war politically inclined Sudanese have identified themselves mainly with the revolutionary states, so it is a matter of some surprise and chagrin to many that the moderates won the day, the more so as the Sudan was in the forefront of states breaking relations with us and took the lead, which happily will not now be followed, in removing their currency reserves from London; the extremists in the Government are particularly embarrassed. Perhaps the dominant feeling is one of pride that the Sudan was able to initiate and preside over a major international event in Khartoum. Most people consider that the expense, estimated at £500,000, was well worthwhile.

13. The Sudanese often say that one of the differences between the Arabs and ourselves is that the Arabs still believe in the doctrine of 'an eye for an eye'. My first reaction therefore is one of relief that the Arabs, baulked of any chance of early revenge against the Israelis, have after all resisted the temptation to vent their spite on the western countries alleged to have helped Israel. It is also encouraging that the Arabs are apparently now ready to seek a political solution through

/diplomatic

diplomatic channels. Any directly negotiated settlement is still out of the question, but the logic of their new stance will compel them to seek support from the western countries as well as from the east, and I have heard that Nasser said as much during the conference.

14. The present Sudanese Government may well have committed itself too deeply to an anti-western policy to change course suddenly the evil genius of the Council of Ministers, Sharif Hussein El Hindi, has already issued a statement that the Government has no intention of resuming relations with the United States, the United Kingdom and West Germany. But there are already distinct signs of a shift in the political climate, and the fact that Hindi has felt it necessary to make such a statement may not be without significance.

15. So far as relations with Britain are concerned, Sudanese and Arabs everywhere will watch very carefully the posture we adopt at the forthcoming meetings of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Your speech, Sir, to the General Assembly in July created a favourable impression and helped us to regain some lost ground. If at future international meetings, we can be seen to stick unequivocally to the doctrine of no territorial advantage through military conquest, I foresee a rapid improvement in our relations with the Sudanese and other Arabs.

Despite the uncompromising resolution of the Conference

/about

about relations with Israel, the Arabs are moving away from 'elimination' as a practical policy and moving slowly towards the idea of coexistence, provided they are not required to cede territory, deal directly, or negotiate any form of permanent peace treaty. The Khartoum Conference has at least opened a road towards the possibility of coexistence in the Middle East.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Algiers, Amman, Beirut, Bahrain, Benghazi, Cairo, Jedda, Kuwait, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, Washington, the United Kingdom Mission,. New York and to the High Commissioner, Aden.

I have the honour to be,
with the highest respect
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

(G.F.N. Reddaway)

Resolutions of the Conference of Arab Kings and Heads of State held in Khartoum between 29th of August and September 1st, 1967

FIRST: The Conference affirmed Arab solidarity and the unification of Arab joint action in a pure atmosphere of coordination and conciliation. Their Majesty and Excellency Kings and Heads of State and their Representatives reaffirmed their commitment of the Charter of Arab solidarity issued at the Third Arab Summit Conference in Casablanca.

SECOND: The Conference affirmed the necessity of concerted joint efforts in the elimination of all traces of aggression on the basis that the recovery of all occupied Arab territory is the joint responsibility of all Arab Nations.

THIRD: The Arab Kings and Heads of State agreed on the unification of their efforts in joint political and diplomatic action at the international level to eliminate the traces of aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territory after June 5th within the frame-work of the basic Arab commitment and conviction which entails non-recognition of Israel, nor conciliation, nor negotiation with her. But upholding the rights of the Palestinian people to their land.

FOURTH: The Ministers of Finance, Economy and Petrol recommended the possibility of using the petrol as a weapon in the struggle.

But the Summit Conference after careful study, sees that the petrol export could be used as a positive weapon, which would be directed towards the consolidation of the economy of the Arab Nations that directly suffered from the aggression to help them in facing the pressures of battle.

It has been decided by the Summit Conference that petroleum, being an effective Arab resource, which could help Arab objectives and could contribute towards helping those countries which were directly affected by the aggression and which have lost their economic resources in facing up to the elimination of the traces of aggression. The petroleum producing countries have already contributed help to those countries to enable them to stand up to any economic pressure.

/FIFTH:

FIFTH: The Conference approved the scheme submitted by Kuwait to establish an Arab Development, Economic and Social Bank in accordance with the recommendations of the Arab Finance, Economy and Petrol Ministers' Conference which met in Baghdad.

SIXTH: The Conference decided that it is necessary to take all steps to consolidate the military preparedness to face all the consequencies of the situation.

SEVENTH: The Conference decided to speed up the liquidation of the foreign bases in the Arab Nations.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

In accordance with the invitation extended by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan for the convening of Their Majesty and Excellency the Arab Kings and Heads of State in a conference in Khartoum between August 29 and September 1, 1967 for the study of the present Arab situation and the preparation of an Arab joint plan for the elimination of the traces of aggression, a meeting was held in Khartoum and was attended by:-

His Majesty King El Hussein Ibn Talal,
King of the Jordanian Hasshimite Kingdom.

His Excellency President Ismail El Azhari,
President of the Supreme Council of State
of the Republic of the Sudan;

His Excellency Farig Abdel Rahman Mohamed Arif,
President of the Iraqi Republic.

His Majesty King Faisal Ibn Abdel Aziz,
King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia;

His Excellency President Gamal Abdel Nasser,
President of the United Arab Republic;

His Excellency President Abdulla El Sallal,
President of the Yemeni Arab Republic;

His Highness Amir Sabah El Salem El Sabah
Amir of Kuwait;

His Excellency President Charles El Helou,
President of the Republic of Lebanon.

His Highness El Hassan El Rida,
Crown Prince of the Libyan Kingdom.

His Excellency Sayed El Bahi El Adgham,
Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs and
Representative of His Excellency President
Habib Bourguiba, President of the Republic
of Tunisia;

His Excellency Sayed Abdel Aziz Boutaflika,
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Member of
the Revolutionary Council and Representative
of His Excellency Howari Boumedienne,
President of the Revolutionary Council and
Prime Minister of the People's Democratic
Republic of Algeria:

/His

His Excellency Dr. Mohamed Ibn Heymeh,
Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Morocco and
Representative of His Majesty King El Hassan II,
King of the Morocco Kingdom; and

Sayed Ahmed El Shoggiri, President of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization.

Their meetings were characterised by a deep joint sense of the historic responsibility that faces the Arab Nations at this crucial and critical period of their struggle. They have emphasized their determination to stand as one united front in the face of the challenges of destiny and the responsibilities that these challenges impose on the Arab Nations.

Their Excellencies Kings and Heads of Arab States and their Representatives have studied the dimensions of the aggression that faced the Arab Nations on the 5th of June and they have decided that the elimination of the traces of aggression from the Arab territory is the joint responsibility of all the Arab Nations. And that it entails the mobilisation of the Arab potentialities with a strong belief in the effectiveness of these potentialities in eliminating the traces of aggression and that the set-back that faced the Arab World should be a strong cause for the unification and consolidation of the joint Arab action.

On the light of this evaluation Their Excellencies Kings and Heads of Arab States and their Representatives agreed upon the effective means to achieve elimination of the traces of aggression and among these is the consideration of the conditions of the countries whose economic resources have suffered directly from the aggression to enable them to stand up in the face of the economic pressures.

Their Excellencies Kings and Heads of State and their Representatives expressed their profound belief and their strong determination to continue the Joint Arab action to preserve the sacred right of the Palestine People to their territory. The Arab Leaders appeal to the peoples and Governments of the World to support this just right by taking positive stands in the face of colonialist and Zionist forces which hinder the Palestinian people from exercising their lawful rights.

Their Excellencies Kings and Heads of Arab States and their Representatives reviewed relations between their Nations in all their aspects and agreed upon taking the steps to consolidate and strengthen these mutual relations in accordance with the Charter of Arab solidarity to achieve the aspirations of the Arab Nations for progress and prosperity. The Arab Leaders expressed their great appreciation for the Government of the sister Sudan for her taking the initial step to invite the Leaders to this historical meeting and they deeply commended the enthusiastic reception of the kind and hospitable Sudanese People.

RESTRICTED
No. 19
(10722)

With the compliments of

THE COMMERCIAL COUNSELLOR

G.F.N. REDDAWAY

H.M. Representative,
Rabat.

A.L. Southorn
15.IX

C d'A

BRITISH EMBASSY
KHARTOUM
SUDAN

I.O. 9/5
F.S.(E)

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY
14 SEP 1967

20/9

F.O. TEL. No. 96 ..... SAVING TO RABAT.

1076

CONFIDENTIAL

AJS 19.IX

T.O. 20/9

Cypher/Cat A

CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 892 8 September, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 892 of 8 September
Repeated for information to:- H.C. Aden (Personal) Jedda, Washington, Paris, Moscow, Belgrade, U.K.Mis New York, Algiers, Amman, Bahrain (Residency) Beirut, Benghazi, Khartoum, Kuwait, Rabat, Tripoli, Tunis, Tel Aviv, LIC Aden and JIC Nicosia.

Arab/Israel.

Heikal's Friday article is an apologia for the Khartoum Summit.

2. His defence is that it was realistic, open, practical and definite. To accusations that it was not (repeat not) "revolutionary" he replies that revolution cannot (repeat not) be the art of the impossible and remarks in passing that there are foreign bases both in Libya and in Algeria. Before Khartoum Summit there had been two disruptive tendencies - peace at any price, and revolution at any price. Happily, it found the middle road: the door of military action remained open, the rich States supporting the fighting States - and the door of political action was not (repeat not) closed, though on fixed conditions no (repeat no) peace with Israel, etc.

3. Kuwait and Libya had both pointed out that to stop oil was self defeating (and Kuwait had cited the danger of United Kingdom/United States military intervention in the Gulf). In any case oil had been reaching United States, United Kingdom and West Germany. It was from the closure of Suez Canal that they had suffered.

4. Why had not (repeat not) Egypt condemned Summit and rallied the Arab masses violently against their Rulers. First because it was Israel that was the enemy - secondly because this was not (repeat not) time to provoke civil war in Arab World (and even those governments where socialism had not (repeat not) yet developed were ready to support the cause) - and thirdly because unity was essential.

/5. Egypt

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 19 SEP 1967

5. Egypt had suffered heavy losses - it could now defend itself but needed time to go over to attack - its ability to keep Canal closed gave time for military and economic rebuilding and for the exertion of pressure, no (repeat no) longer on its friends but, with Arab help, on those it did not (repeat not) consider friends. It could now embark on a vast internal activity backed by a united Arab world.

6. Yemen. He had not (repeat not) included the Yemen among the accomplishments of Summit because the problem was settled in effect once Britain announced it would leave South Arabia. There was now no (repeat no) reason for Egyptian Army to remain. Egypt had no (repeat no) need of a base and the revolution in Yemen had no (repeat no) need of support. Things could never go back to the past. A new factor was the prospective creation of an independent South Arabia which by all the signs would be a progressive State. Indeed the continued presence of Egyptian Army could inhibit the natural development of Yemen's evolution.

7. Comment. Heikal no (repeat no) longer finds it necessary to reply specifically to his opponents in the domestic debate of recent weeks, which had virtually fizzled out. But his article is on the defensive against the extremists - and the Left Wing Intellectual Lufti El Kholi, writing in El Ahram the previous day revives all the accusations of United States, Britain, West German and indeed Dutch collaboration with Israel, and the machinations of the Imperialist/Capitalist/Zionist system with its Arab agents and recommended urgent study of techniques of guerrilla warfare in Middle East terrain.

Foreign Office please pass to: H.C. Aden (Personal) 64, Jedda 58 and unnumbered Saving to: Washington, Paris, Moscow, Belgrade, U.K.Mis New York, Algiers, Amman, Beirut, Bahrain (Residency), Benghazi, Khartoum, Kuwait, Rabat, Tripoli, Tunis, Tel Aviv, LIC Aden and JIC Nicosia.

Mr. Tesh Sent 1130Z 8 September, 1967

Recd 1130Z 8 September, 1967

[Repeated as requested]

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BRITISH EMBASSY

KUWAIT

(11614) 10 September, 1967.

Kuwait's Commitments from the Summit Conference

Sayyid Yusif al Masa'id, the editor of the Kuwait daily 'al Rai al Amm', who was a member of the press delegation accompanying Kuwait's delegation to the Summit Conference, has told Noel Brehony that in addition to the £55 million a year that she is contributing to the U.A.R. and Jordan, Kuwait undertook at the Summit Conference to pay £18 million a year for arms purchases. Masa'id's story is that Kuwait refused to buy arms directly from Moscow but agreed to pay the £18 million (with contributions, too, from Libya and Saudi Arabia) to Sudan and Algeria who would purchase arms on behalf of the other Arab countries not directly assisted by the U.S.S.R.

2. The U.S. Embassy here has also had this story from Masa'id (who is not entirely reliable) but so far we have been unable to confirm it from any other source. With Kuwait's delegation to the conference dispersing to Cairo, Beirut, Paris and London, in fact in every direction but Kuwait, we have not had very much chance. However, the Ambassador hopes to see several Ministers this week and will try the story on them.

3. I am copying this letter to the Chanceries in Amman, Bahrain, Beirut, Cairo, Jedda, Khartoum, Rabat, Tunis, Tripoli and Benghazi.

(C.C.R. Battiscombe)

A. Ibbott, Esq.,
Arabian Department,
Foreign Office.

AJS 19.IX

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 19 SEP 1967

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BRITISH EMBASSY,
TUNIS.
11 September, 1967.

The Arab Summit

The only authoritative comment I have so far had here about the Khartoum summit was the exposé given me by Mohamed Essafi, the Tunisian Ambassador to London, when he came to dine with me on 6 September.

2. According to Essafi's account, the Tunisian Government had been well satisfied with the outcome of the Khartoum round of conferences which he described as a triumph for Bourguiba and the moderates. He did not feel that the Syrians (he did not include the Algerians) could hold out indefinitely against the decision of the rest to restart oil supplies to the U.K. and U.S., and did not expect them to do so.

3. He went on to say that Nasser's "conversion" to moderation, temporary though it might be, considerably reduced the threat to both Libya and Tunisia, though a threat still existed. When I questioned him about Algeria, he said that he did not expect a direct attack on Tunisia in the foreseeable future, but did not exclude the possibility of the Algerians mounting subversive activities here. However, the Algerians too would sooner or later have to toe the moderate line.

4. I expressed some scepticism about all this - one isn't usually very popular when one has turned out to be right and everyone else wrong. But Essafi seemed determined to radiate sunshine - so much so that I suspect that this was the party line adopted at the recent Ambassadors' conference.

5 In general, however, the Khartoum summit has been speedily overlaid here, and public attention has been diverted to the Mediterranean Games - on which this semi-bankrupt country, it is announced without a flicker of shame, is spending three million pounds! Press comment continues to suggest that everyone has now fallen into step with Bourguiba, and adopted his more realistic and long-term policy for dealing with the Israel question.

6. I am sending copies of this letter to Khartoum, Beirut, Jedda, Amman, Kuwait, Cairo, Benghazi, Tripoli, Algiers, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Washington and Paris.

(R.W.J. Hooper)

D.J. Spearce, Esq.,
North and East African Department,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

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(1075)

The Chancery, Rabat

With the compliments of

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
AMBASSADOR

A.L. Southorn 19-IX

C d'A 20/9

BRITISH EMBASSY

TUNIS

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19 SEP 1967

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En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cypher MR A

[Distribution Heading]

FROM 70 TO RABAT

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 486 D M

[Date] 11 Sept. R M

Repeated to

A.L. Souther 12.IX

[Priority]

C a i/F Off.
I.O. 13/8

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ADDRESSED TO CAIRO TELEGRAM NUMBER 1224 OF

11 SEPTEMBER REPTD FOR INFMN TO OTTAWA. WASHINGTON.

Ccn. requested 13/9
Received 13/9.

BEIRUT. JEDDA. ADEN (PERSONAL). KUWAIT. BENGHAZI.

TRIPOLI. KHARTOUM. TUNIS. RABAT. ALGIERS. ANKARA.

AND SAVING TO BAHRAIN (RESIDENCY).

MY TELEGRAM 1221 (NOT TO ALL): Not here.

DISTRIBUTION

HEIKAL~S ARTICLE IN SUNDAY TIMES.

NEWS DEPARTMENT STATED ON THE RECORD THIS MORNING:

~~QUOTE~~

THIS IS CLEARLY AN IMPORTANT ARTICLE WHICH IS BEING STUDIED WITH INTEREST IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE"

~~UNQUOTE~~.

2. THEY HAVE ADDED UNATTRIBUTABLY THAT WE HAVE ALWAYS HELD THE VIEW SINCE THE RUPTURE OF

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

Relations

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

RELEATIONS IN DECEMBER. 1965. THAT DIPLOMATIC CONTACT BETWEEN THE UK AND THE UAR WAS DESIRABLE: INDEED IT HAS BEEN AND STILL IS OUR BELIEF THAT IT IS JUST WHEN THERE ARE REAL AND DIFFICULT PROBLEMS TO BE DISCUSSED THAT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ARE MOST VALUABLE. SOSFA

BRITISH EMBASSY,
BONN.

1076

UNCLASSIFIED

11 September, 1967.

German Development Aid to the Middle East

On 8 September, Handelsblatt, the principal German economic leading daily newspaper, published an interview with Herr Willy Brandt, the Federal Foreign Minister, in which, among other subjects, they asked him about development aid in the Arab world and Israel. The following is a full translation of his reply.

"The Federal Government declared when a number of Arab states broke off diplomatic relations that it was ready to agree to projects of capital aid and technical assistance which were current and the subject of agreements which had already been signed. We have adhered to this promise. However, there were difficulties which arose through the events of war in the Middle East which made necessary the evacuation of a fairly large number of experts. Most of these have since then returned to their places of work and are now devoting themselves to the tasks given them.

These old projects have therefore been carried on in such countries; meanwhile, in the Arab countries with which we maintain diplomatic relations new projects have been started. Governmental agreement for capital aid of DM 40 million (£3.6 million) will shortly be signed with Jordan; negotiations with Tunisia have recently been concluded; negotiations with Morocco are about to begin.

In addition to its development assistance, the Federal Republic is making efforts to minimise the need of those who have suffered through the conflict in the Near East. The Federal Government has declared its readiness frequently to make an appropriate contribution to the rebuilding of the areas hit by the war. It devotes particular attention to the lot of the refugees, in view of its own bitter experience.

In principle, it is probable that the Federal Republic will give economic assistance in the current year to Israel, but in detail this matter is being reserved for a later date. We proceed from the basis that Israel will receive economic assistance, within the boundaries of what is possible to us, under the same conditions as other states concerned."

I am copying this letter to the Chanceries in Tel Aviv, Amman, Tunis and Rabat.

(A.C. Goodison)

J.C. Moberly, Esq.,
Eastern Department.

11 September, 1967.

(11261)

With the compliments of

CHANCERY

(A.C. Goodison)

A.L. Sowton 15.IX

C d'A/ 18/9

BRITISH EMBASSY

BONN

1.6.4

FS(E)

The Chancery,
British Embassy,
Rabat.

RECEIVED IN CHANCERY
14 SEP 1967

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1016

PRODROME RABAT
FOR 004 FOLDN 130400Z GR 126
ROUTINE TEL AVIV TO RABAT
TELNO 11 12 SEP 1967.

ADDSD FO TELNO 1021 OF 12 SEPT RFI TO UKMIS NY, UKDEL GENEVA AMMAN JERUSALEM TRIPOLI BENGHAZI KUWAIT BAHRAIN (RESIDENCY) KHARTOUM JEDDA RABAT TUNIS CAIRO ALGIERS W'TON AND BEIRUT.
MYTELNO 007. REFUGEES.
THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR ANNOUNCED ON 11 SEPT THAT THE RETURN OF THE REMAINING REFUGEES WHOSE APPLICATION FOR MS HAVE BEEN APPROVED WILL BEGIN ON SUNDAY , 17 SEPT. THE CROSSING S WILL TAKE PLACE ON SUNDAY S TUESDAYS AND FRIDAYS VIA THE ALLENBY BRIDGE.
2. NO DEADLINE HAS BEEN SET FOR THE PRESENT COMPLETION OF THIS OPERATION AND NO DAILY MAXIMUM HAS BEEN FIXED , ALTHOUGH IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO HANDLE SOME 1500 REFUGEES EACH DAY . A TOTAL OF 7000 ARE EXPECTED TO RETURN .
HADOW

VSENT 0402Z/12 AW

PRODROME RABAT

A L Southorn 13.IX

This has been briefly reported in the press here C dLA Jan 13/9
K.D. 13/9

1076

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En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
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En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cypher/CAT A

[Distribution Heading]

FROM 70 TO RABAT

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 471

[Date] 12 Sept

D M

R M

Repeated to

A.L. Southorn 13.IX

C d'A Thw 17/9

[Priority]

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO BEIRUT TELEGRAM NO 2323 OF 12 SEPTEMBER

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN. BAHRAIN. CAIRO.

JEDDA. KHARTOUM. KUWAIT. RABAT . TUNIS. TRIPOLI.

UKMIS NEW YORK. WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS. 1027 AND 1029: - RETURN OF AMBASSADORS.

DISTRIBUTION

YOU SHOULD TELL THE LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT WE WELCOME HIS GOVERNMENT~S DECISION TO PROPOSE THE RETURN TO LONDON OF THE LEBANESE AMBASSADOR AND TO INVITE US TO SEND THE NEW BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO BEIRUT. AS HE KNOWS. THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW AMBASSADORS WAS NONE OF OUR MAKING: WE REGRETTED IT AT THE TIME BOTH AS BEING BASED ON COMPLETELY UNFOUNDED ALLEGATIONS ABOUT BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE ARAB/ISRAEL WAR AND AS COMING AT A TIME WHEN

/Relations

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES WERE DIFFICULT AND IT WAS THEREFORE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT TO HAVE THE BEST POSSIBLE CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION.

2. YOU SHOULD TELL THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT AS THERE WAS NO FORMAL BREACH OF RELATIONS. THE LEBANESE AMBASSADOR MAY RETURN AS SOON AS CONVENIENT WITHOUT THERE BEING ANY NEED FOR FRESH AGREMENT. MR KING WILL ARRIVE IN BEIRUT ON 29 SEPTEMBER AS ORIGINALLY PLANNED.

3. YOU SHOULD ALSO SAY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT I AM HOPING THAT THE LEBANESE AMBASSADOR WILL SOON AFTER HIS ARRIVAL BE IN A POSITION TO COMMUNICATE TO ME THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT~S PROPOSAL FOR PAYING COMPENSATION FOR LOSS AND DAMAGE TO BRITISH PROPERTY DURING THE DISTURBANCES IN EARLY JULY AND ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS. (THE REFERENCE TO PREVIOUS OCCASIONS IS IMPORTANT AS THERE ARE STILL CLAIMS OUTSTANDING FOR COMPENSATION FOR MECAS STUDENTS FOR PROPERTY LOST DURING THE 1958 DISTURBANCES.)

4. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION WE WERE DISSATISFIED WITH SOME ASPECTS OF MR DIMECHKIE~S CONDUCT WHILE HE WAS HERE BEFORE (SEE MY TELEGRAM NO 1427 OF 9 JUNE): IN particular

PARTICULAR HE SEEMS TO HAVE TAKEN A LEAD AMONGST HIS ARAB COLLEAGUES IN A SENSE HOSTILE TO THHIS COUNTRY AT THE TIME OF THE ARAB/ISRAEL WAR. WE CONSIDERED WHETHER WE SHOULD TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ASK THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO SEND SOMEONE ELSE BUT DECIDED AGAINST THIS IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. WE PROPOSE, THEREFORE, TO LET HIM KNOW AFTER HIS ARRIVAL THAT WE ARE AWARE OF SOME OF HIS UNFRIENDLY ACTIVITIES AND TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THERE WILL BE NO REPETITION OF THIS KIND OF THING. SOSFA

1076

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Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution

SUDAN
13 September, 1967
Section 1

THE ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE AT KHARTOUM, 29 AUGUST TO 1 SEPTEMBER, 1967

Mr. Reddaway to Mr. Brown. (Received 13 September)

SUMMARY

All Arab States except Syria were represented. King Hassan of Morocco, King Idris of Libya and President Boumeddienne sent representatives. (Paragraphs 1–2.)

Two meetings of Foreign Ministers at Khartoum and the meeting of Economic Ministers at Baghdad paved the way but all contentious issues were left for the leaders to decide; in all likelihood it was President Nasser's personal decision that the conference should take place despite the fact that the preparatory meetings had shown that the moderates could not be bullied into applying economic sanctions against the West. (Paragraphs 3–4.)

Nasser's decision to do a deal with the moderates does not imply any willingness to negotiate directly with Israel, but he made it clear that an early resumption of the war was out of the question. (Paragraphs 5–6.)

Proceedings of the conference are probably accurately reflected in the resolutions. The reference to action at international level denotes moves to bring pressure to bear on Israel at the United Nations. (Paragraph 7.)

The agreement reached by Faisal and Nasser on the Yemen is regarded as genuine. (Paragraph 8.)

The absence of the Syrians at first caused disappointment but the performance of Makhous convinced the Sudanese that they were no great loss. (Paragraph 9.)

Nasser was the dominant figure inside and outside the conference. For the Sudanese at least he remains, despite his humiliating military defeat, the only credible leader of the Arab cause. Faisal established himself as the leader of the moderates and Mahgoub earned credit for his part in convening the conference. (Paragraphs 10–11.)

The Sudanese handled the arrangements well; the only unpleasantness was caused by the Yemenis demonstrating against the Faisal/Nasser agreement. They gave all delegations a warm welcome but Nasser was their hero. (Paragraph 12.)

The outcome of the conference was satisfactory. A damaging oil boycott has been averted and it is a step forward that the Arabs are ready to seek a political solution short of a direct settlement with the Israelis. The possibility of co-existence in the Middle East has been opened. (Paragraph 13.)

The present Sudan Government has committed itself too deeply to change course suddenly but there are signs of a shift in the political climate. (Paragraph 14.)

The Arabs will observe closely our actions at the United Nations. If we can be seen to stick to the doctrine of no territorial advantage through military conquest a rapid turn for the better in our relations with them is probable. (Paragraph 15.)

20398—276 8230—37

A

British Interests Section
of the Italian Embassy,
Khartoum,

(No. 19. Restricted)

Sir, *8 September, 1967.*

I have the honour to report on the Conference of Arab Heads of State, which took place in Khartoum from the 29th of August to the 1st of September, 1967, for the purpose of drawing up concerted plans to reverse the defeats suffered by the Arab countries in the war with Israel, or in the phrase which is used so often here " to remove the vestiges of Israeli aggression ".

2. I have already reported by telegram the main features of the conference and, for ease of of reference, I reproduce as an Annex to this despatch the joint communiqué and the agreed resolutions announced at the end of the conference; the communiqué contains a list of delegates. King Hassan of Morocco, President Bourguiba of Tunis, King Idris of Libya sent representatives; President Boumeddienne threatened that Algeria would not take part, but at the last moment sent his Foreign Secretary, Boutiflika. Syria was the only absentee, though Dr. Makhous, the Syrian Foreign Secretary, took part in the preparatory meeting of Foreign Ministers and did not actually leave Khartoum until the conference was well under way.

3. I have already described in my despatch No. 18 of the 11th of August how the idea of an Arab Summit Conference was conceived by the Sudanese in the immediate wake of the war and how, after much hesitation and uncertainty, the way for the conference was paved by a meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers in Khartoum during the first week of August. In further efforts to harmonise conflicting political and economic interests, a meeting of Economic and Oil Ministers was held in Baghdad on the 16th of August, and a second meeting of Foreign Ministers took place in Khartoum immediately before the Summit itself. The economic meeting was inconclusive; the inconsistency between the embargo on oil shipments to the West and the need to help the victim countries could not be evaded. The curtain raiser in Khartoum was a hasty formality at which the Foreign Ministers drew up an agenda designed to exclude nothing and to commit nobody and dexterously passed out all the contentious issues to their masters with scarcely a jink. There were also two notable individual efforts during the preliminary phase: King Hussein made a lightning tour of the capitals of the more moderate States: it is likely that he impressed upon his hosts the desperate plight of Jordan, and it is rumoured from a number of sources that he lobbied support for a rather curious plan of setting up a separate demilitarised Palestine State comprising the West Bank of the Jordan and the Gaza Strip; there is even a rumour that he had the secret support of Nasser for proposing such a scheme. The second individual effort was that of Mahgoub, the Sudanese Prime Minister, who visited Saudi Arabia and Egypt in search of a settlement of the dispute between Egypt and Saudi Arabia over the Yemen.

4. These preliminaries obviously had as their purpose the establishment of sufficient common ground to enable the Arab leaders to meet at all. Nasser was the key. At the earlier meetings in Khartoum and particularly at Baghdad it emerged that the moderates could not be bullied into prolonging the oil embargo, limited or unlimited; into removing their currency reserves from Western countries; or into a complete break with Britain, the United States and West Germany.

5. Where would Nasser put his weight? This was the question. From the moment that he rose to make his long key speech at the first closed session of the conference it could not be concealed that he had accepted the realities of the situation; whatever he might feel about Israel or about the revolution in the Yemen (and there is no reason to suppose that he has changed his views about either) his economic and military plight compelled him to seek a peaceful solution and try to rebuild his country's shattered strength. The enfeebled lion would perforce lie down with the lambs.

6. However, as seen from here Nasser's willingness to do a deal with the moderates does not imply willingness on his part to enter into any form of direct negotiations with Israel. The bitter hatred of Israel and all it stands for is unimpaired. On the other hand, an early resumption of the war is unthinkable. I have been told a story that at the beginning of the conference Nasser remarked that the first item on the agenda appeared to call for a resumption of the war, and he was greeted with silence

when he went on to say that Egypt was in no position to fight and he would like to know what other country was ready to take up arms. From there on the main issue confronting the conference was whether the struggle could be carried on most effectively by imposing economic sanctions on the West, or by garnering and pooling the resources of the Arab world. The second course won the day, and there is now talk of seeking the co-operation of the West, as well as of the East, in driving the Israelis back behind their borders. The Sudanese, who suffer more than most Arab countries from the closure of the canal, acquiesce in its continued closure at the expense of the oil rich States because they share Nasser's hope that it will move the rest of the world to force the Israelis to withdraw.

7. The conference itself, apart from a formal opening speech by President Azhari and the announcement of the communiqué at the end, was held behind closed doors. Most of the discussions that took place are probably reflected in the resolutions. Nasser's alignment with the moderates in return for a hefty subvention curtailed the debate. There could only be one public verdict on the canal while the Israelis remain entrenched on the east bank. The resolution calling for continued action at international level is clear evidence that diplomatic tactics were discussed. The most likely conclusion is that Nasser was invited to continue his dialogue with the Russians and Tito, and that it was agreed in general terms that the Security Council and the General Assembly would be the arena for the next Arab diplomatic offensive. It was probably agreed that the resumption of oil supplies together with the relatively non-aggressive tone of the communiqué opened the door to better relations with the West with the hope that they might be persuaded to exert pressure on Israel. de Gaulle, for all his efforts, does not appear to have had a mention.

8. With no direct access to the proceedings of the conference, the main interest in Khartoum centred on the Yemeni settlement, and on the antics of the odd men out—Makhous, Shukairi and Sallal. Nasser and Faisal arrived in Khartoum simultaneously and met to discuss the Yemen almost as soon as they reached their hotel. Later there was a three-hour meeting in Mahgoub's private house, conveniently overlooked by the Information Officer's house from which the comings and goings could be observed. It is universally believed in Khartoum that genuine and complete agreement was reached. The agreement was denounced immediately by Sallal and there were violent anti-Nasser demonstrations by the Yemenis in Khartoum the following day. The Sudanese wonder how the agreement can be made to work without Yemeni co-operation, but have faith in Mahgoub's powers of persuasion.

9. For the rest, there was little surprise or concern that King Hassan, King Idris and President Bourguiba decided to send representatives. But, the Sudan having aligned itself with the revolutionary camp, there was considerable annoyance and disappointment that the Syrians and, as it first seemed, the Algerians, would take no part. The performance of the Syrians at and after the Foreign Ministers' Meeting convinced most Sudanese that they were no great loss. Mahgoub is supposed to have compared Makhous, the Syrian Foreign Minister, with the president of a students' union. Shukairi, the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, who strongly criticised the agreed resolutions, walked out before the end; no one seemed to mind; the Sudanese explained that Shukairi seldom attends the last session of any conference. The Arab League was strongly criticised by Sudanese leaders for its failure to play a positive role and its non-representation at the conference; there is a general view here that the League needs a drastic overhaul.

10. *The Economist* of the 2nd of September predicted that the Summit Conference " will prove whether President Nasser can still navigate the Arabs or whether he can only drift on an ungovernable tide ". The verdict must be that he was unquestionably the captain of the Arab ship. We were debarred by our hole-in-the-corner status from taking part in any of the official functions, but he was plainly the dominant figure. He was greeted with tremendous enthusiasm, and chanting crowds followed him wherever he went. He dominated capital and conference alike. His move towards the moderates gave meaning to the conference. With Nasser a moderate, however temporarily, it does not seem to matter greatly that the Algerians are lukewarm and the Syrians hostile. However serious his domestic and economic problems, this was his conference.

11. The other two stars were Faisal and Mahgoub. The Sudanese gave Faisal a polite rather than enthusiastic reception, but his dignity and determination stamped him as the unmistakable leader of the moderates. Mahgoub probably had little influence on the main decisions of the conference, but he earned great credit by his success in convening the conference and handling the proceedings. Hussein and Arif did not come into the limelight; the other Arab leaders were, in the main, content to leave the running to Faisal and Nasser.

12. In their customary "it will be all right on the night" fashion the Sudanese did very well as hosts. Large cheerful crowds thronged the streets, but apart from a demonstration by the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation which, through force of habit, broke through the police cordon and yelled "Down, down USA" outside the American Embassy building, and a more unpleasant affair outside the Egyptian Embassy staged by Yemenis protesting against the Nasser/Faisal agreement, there was no unpleasantness. There was no noticeable anti-Western feeling. Exceptionally heavy rains in August have almost cut off Khartoum from supplies of petrol, aviation fuel and food, but, by raiding the supplies of the rest of the population, the arrangements for the conference were not affected by these shortages. The Sudanese gave a warm welcome to all the Heads of State. Distinguished visiting journalists from Britain were treated as old friends, and the prominence given to the conference and the tributes paid to Mahgoub in leading British newspapers, will pour oil on the troubled waters of Anglo-Sudanese relations. Since the outbreak of the war politically-inclined Sudanese have identified themselves mainly with the revolutionary States, so it is a matter of some surprise and chagrin to many that the moderates won the day, the more so as the Sudan was in the forefront of States breaking relations with us and took the lead, which happily will not now be followed, in removing their currency reserves from London; the extremists in the Government are particularly embarrassed. Perhaps the dominant feeling is one of pride that the Sudan was able to initiate and preside over a major international event in Khartoum. Most people consider that the expense, estimated at £500,000, was well worth while.

13. The Sudanese often say that one of the differences between the Arabs and ourselves is that the Arabs still believe in the doctrine of "an eye for an eye". My first reaction therefore is one of relief that the Arabs, baulked of any chance of early revenge against the Israelis, have after all resisted the temptation to vent their spite on the Western countries alleged to have helped Israel. It is also encouraging that the Arabs are apparently now ready to seek a political solution through diplomatic channels. Any directly negotiated settlement is still out of the question, but the logic of their new stance will compel them to seek support from the Western countries as well as from the East, and I have heard that Nasser said as much during the conference.

14. The present Sudanese Government may well have committed itself too deeply to an anti-Western policy to change course suddenly; the evil genius of the Council of Ministers, Sharif Hussein El Hindi, has already issued a statement that the Government has no intention of resuming relations with the United States, the United Kingdom and West Germany. But there are already distinct signs of a shift in the political climate, and the fact that Hindi has felt it necessary to make such a statement may not be without significance.

15. So far as relations with Britain are concerned, Sudanese and Arabs everywhere will watch very carefully the posture we adopt at the forthcoming meetings of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Your speech, Sir, to the General Assembly in July created a favourable impression and helped us to regain some lost ground. If at future international meetings, we can be seen to stick unequivocally to the doctrine of no territorial advantage through military conquest, I foresee a rapid improvement in our relations with the Sudanese and other Arabs. Despite the uncompromising resolution of the conference about relations with Israel, the Arabs are moving away from "elimination" as a practical policy and moving slowly towards the idea of co-existence, provided they are not required to cede territory, deal directly, or negotiate any form of permanent peace treaty. The Khartoum Conference has at least opened a road towards the possibility of co-existence in the Middle East.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Algiers,

Amman, Beirut, Bahrain, Benghazi, Cairo, Jedda, Kuwait, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, Washington, the United Kingdom Mission, New York, and to the High Commissioner, Aden.

I have, &c.

G. F. N. REDDAWAY.

ANNEX

Resolutions of the Conference of Arab Kings and Heads of State held in Khartoum between 29 August and 1 September, 1967

First: The conference affirmed Arab solidarity and the unification of Arab joint action in a pure atmosphere of co-ordination and conciliation. Their Majesty and Excellency Kings and Heads of State and their representatives reaffirmed their commitment of the Charter of Arab solidarity issued at the Third Arab Summit Conference in Casablanca.

Second: The conference affirmed the necessity of concerted joint efforts in the elimination of all traces of aggression on the basis that the recovery of all occupied Arab territory is the joint responsibility of all Arab nations.

Third: The Arab Kings and Heads of State agreed on the unification of their efforts in joint political and diplomatic action at the international level to eliminate the traces of aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territory after 5 June within the framework of the basic Arab commitment and conviction which entails non-recognition of Israel, nor conciliation, nor negotiation with her. But upholding the rights of the Palestinian people to their land.

Fourth: The Ministers of Finance, Economy and Petrol recommended the possibility of using the petrol as a weapon in the struggle.

But the Summit Conference after careful study, sees that the petrol export could be used as a positive weapon, which would be directed towards the consolidation of the economy of the Arab Nations that directly suffered from the aggression to help them in facing the pressures of battle.

It has been decided by the Summit Conference that petroleum, being an effective Arab resource, which could help Arab objectives and could contribute towards helping those countries which were directly affected by the aggression and which have lost their economic resources in facing up to the elimination of the traces of aggression. The petroleum-producing countries have already contributed help to these countries to enable them to stand up to any economic pressure.

Fifth: The conference approved the scheme submitted by Kuwait to establish an Arab Development, Economic and Social Bank in accordance with the recommendations of the Arab Finance, Economy and Petrol Ministers' Conference which met in Baghdad.

Sixth: The conference decided that it is necessary to take all steps to consolidate the military preparedness to face all the consequences of the situation.

Seventh: The conference decided to speed up the liquidation of the foreign bases in the Arab nations.

Joint Communiqué

In accordance with the invitation extended by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan for the convening of their Majesty and Excellency the Arab Kings and Heads of State in a conference in Khartoum between 29 August and 1 September, 1967, for the study of the present Arab situation and the preparation of an Arab joint plan for the elimination of the traces of aggression, a meeting was held in Khartoum and was attended by:

His Majesty King El Hussein Ibn Talal, King of the Jordanian Hasshimite Kingdom;

His Excellency President Ismail El Azhari, President of the Supreme Council of State of the Republic of the Sudan;

His Excellency Farig Abdel Rahman Mohamed Arif, President of the Iraqi Republic;

His Majesty King Faisal Ibn Abdel Aziz, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia;

His Excellency President Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of the United Arab Republic;

His Excellency President Abdulla El Sallal, President of the Yemeni Arab Republic;

His Highness Amir Sabah El Salem El Sabah, Amir of Kuwait;

His Excellency President Charles El Helou, President of the Republic of Lebanon;

His Highness El Hassan El Rida, Crown Prince of the Libyan Kingdom;

His Excellency Sayed El Bahi El Adgham, Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs and Representative of His Excellency President Habib Bourguiba, President of the Republic of Tunisia;

His Excellency Sayed Abdel Aziz Bouteflika, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Member of the Revolutionary Council and Representative of His Excellency Howari Boumedienne, President of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria;

His Excellency Dr. Mahmmed Ibn Heymah, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Morocco and Representative of His Majesty King El Hassan II, King of the Morocco Kingdom; and

Sayed Ahmed El Shukairi, President of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation.

Their meetings were characterised by a deep joint sense of the historic responsibility that faces the Arab nations at this crucial and critical period of their struggle. They have emphasised their determination to stand as one united front in the face of the challenges of destiny and the responsibilities that these challenges impose on the Arab nations.

Their Excellencies Kings and Heads of Arab States and their Representatives have studied the dimensions of the aggression that faced the Arab nations on 5 June and they have decided that the elimination of the traces of aggression from the Arab territory is the joint responsibility of all the Arab nations. And that it entails the mobilisation of the Arab potentialities with a strong belief in the effectiveness of these potentialities in eliminating the traces of aggression and that the setback that faced the Arab World should be a strong cause for the unification and consolidation of the joint Arab action.

On the light of this evaluation Their Excellencies Kings and Heads of Arab States and their Representatives agreed upon the effective means to achieve elimination of the traces of aggression and among these is the consideration of the conditions of the countries whose economic resources have suffered directly from the aggression to enable them to stand up in the face of the economic pressures.

Their Excellencies Kings and Heads of State and their Representatives expressed their profound belief and their strong determination to continue the joint Arab action to preserve the sacred right of the Palestine people to their territory. The Arab leaders appeal to the peoples and Governments of the world to support this just right by taking positive stands in the face of colonialist and Zionist forces which hinder the Palestinian people from exercising their lawful rights.

Their Excellencies Kings and Heads of Arab States and their Representatives reviewed relations between their nations in all their aspects and agreed upon taking the steps to consolidate and strengthen these mutual relations in accordance with the Charter of Arab solidarity to achieve the aspirations of the Arab nations for progress and prosperity. The Arab leaders expressed their great appreciation for the Government of the sister Sudan for her taking the initial step to invite the leaders to this historical meeting and they deeply commended the enthusiastic reception of the kind and hospitable Sudanese people.